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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine certain aspects of the de-
cision-making processes of intergovernmental institutions established
for regulating interactions in the exploitation of ocean fisheries.' The
aspects selected are those denominated as internal constitutional ar-
rangements; embracing, more specifically, the grant of capacity to the
group, membership provisions, structure, objectives, and distribution
of certain authority functions within the commissions. Very little at-
tention is devoted to the external decision-making process involving
the fishery commissions with other participants, including members
and other public or private entities which a more comprehensive study
would embrace.2 Fortunately, in light of anticipated developments in
world fishery exploitation, responsible agencies and officials recognize
'For purposes of this paper eight commissions were studied. The commissions
and their member states at the time of this writing are:
The International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) (Halibut) (1953): Can-
ada, United States.
The International Pacific Salmon Commission (Salmon) (1938, 1957): Canada, United
States.
The International Whaling Commission (Whaling) (1948): Austria, Brazil, Can-
ada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ghana,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain,
Sudan, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United
Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia.
The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) (Tuna) (1950): Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, United States.
The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)
(1950): Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) (1953): Canada,
Japan, United States.
The Fur Seal Commission (Seal) (1957): Canada, Japan, Soviet Union, United
States.
The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) (1963): Belgium, Den-
mark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
The dates in parentheses refer to the date of effectiveness for the basic treaty (or
treaties) examined in this paper. The order of listing is the order in which the
commissions were created, an event which sometimes preceded the conclusion of
the last agreement concerning the commission. Not all of these organizations were
studied in the same detail due, as the text notes, to the differing availability of
documents. See note 5 infra.
In referring subsequently to the constitutive documents for these organizations,
no citation to their source is given since they are commonly available. A most use-
ful compilation, prepared for the Senate Committee on Commerce, is LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 89th CONG., 1st SEss., TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONTAINING PROVISIONS ON COMMERCIAL
FISHERIES, MARINE RESOURCES, SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES IS A PARTY (1965). The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention,
to which the United States is not a party at this writing, is in Cmd. No. 2190.
'The outlines of this more comprehensive inquiry are in W. BURKE, OCEAN
SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 80-85
(1966). The present discussion represents partial execution of one-fourth of this
outline.
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the necessity for inquiries similar if not the same as the present, and
work on such projects is proceeding.3
Since this is a preliminary, and partial, undertaking, there is no need
to apologize for the limited recourse to source material, though the
fact should be noted. Ideally a study of decision-making processes
would begin with documentary evidence and later acquire richness and
depth through personal interviews and communication.' Here only the
beginning stage was possible, primarily because of time limitations.
In addition, even the available documentation is limited either because
particular fishery commissions offer only brief public reports of their
work or because documents are not publicly available. Commission
practice in this respect varies enormously, ranging from virtually com-
plete public disclosure to complete unwillingness to divulge even minor
detail.3
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION
A. Legal Capacity-Grant by Member States
The states establishing a multilateral organization face no unique
or difficult problems in clarifying the legal capacity of the group as an
independent entity, assuming they have the will to do so. The major
problem involved, if it can be called major, is that of avoiding such an
excessively detailed specification of legal capacity that future contin-
gencies can be met only through evasion, undue delay, or awkward
'The work of the Legislation Research Branch of the FAO is most prominent.
See FAO LEGISLATION RESEARCH BRA cH, COUPARISON AND ABSTRACTS OF SELECTED
CONVENTIONS ESTABLISHING FISHERIES Com -ssloNs (1962). See also: Carroz,
Establishment, Structure, Functions and Activities of International Fisheries Bod-
ies, I Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council, FAO Doc. FIb/T57 (1965); id. II Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, FAO Doc. FIb/T58 (1965); id. III Regional
Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Southwest Atlantic, FAO Doc. FRm/T60
(1966) ; International Fisheries Bodies, FAO Doc. FI/T64 (En) (1966).
" McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 Am. 3. INT'L L. 1, 26 (1959) refer to these stages of inquiry into
public order systems as follows:
Broadly conceived, the most promising strategy of inquiry moves from the well
known to the less known, in this case implying that a beginning is made by
employing the operations familiar to all legal scholars, then proceeding to the
phases of the situation for which the social and behavioral sciences provide
the sharpest instruments.
'It is pertinent to note here that inquiries were directed to all the fishery com-
missions mentioned in note 1, supra (except the Fur Seal Commission) seeking in-
formation and cooperation. The replies and subsequent communications were en-
lightening. Although all groups responded (some much later than others), it is
apparent that certain of them have rather restrictive policies toward disclosure of
information such as that sought in this study. Two bodies, the Salmon and the
North Pacific Commissions, are worth special mention. The Salmon Commission
policy is that any information concerning its operations, beyond that contained in
its annual reports and scientific reports, must be sought from the respective signa-
19671
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administrative detours. The formula for such avoidance is not difficult
to discover and to adopt. Should, on the other hand, states desire to
confer only limited competence to perform legal acts, the problem is
again not difficult, for a statement of circumscribed capacity is easily
devised or, if need be, discovered in the charter of another comparable
international group.6 These alternatives do not exhaust the courses of
action states may employ on this problem, for it is also possible to
say nothing on the subject either because it does not occur to the
negotiators to make explicit provision, perhaps assuming that capacity
is implicit, or because the states do not wish to confer legal capacity.
All of the commission agreements, except the fur seal, halibut, and
whaling agreements, envisage, with varying degrees of explicitness,
the conferment of some, though limited, legal capacity upon the orga-
nization.' The North Pacific Convention is the most direct, article
11(13) declaring that the Commission "may employ personnel and ac-
quire facilities necessary for the performance of its functions." This is
not, rather clearly, an extensive conferment of competence. Although
tory governments and, in particular, from the Canadian Deputy Minister of Fish-
eries and, in the United States, the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State
for Fisheries and Wildlife. With all due respect to these offices and the occupants
thereof, it is doubtful whether this Commission decision promotes disclosure of
relevant information. It seems quite obvious that the national officials concerned
could not be expected to be in possession of many of the details about the operations
of the Commission.
The North Pacific Commission policy places severe limitation upon access to
information. By Commission decision the written proceedings of the annual meet-
ings are "to be distributed only to those persons designated from among their na-
tionals by each national section." 1957 INPFC ANi. REP. 4. Although the annual
reports are made freely available, the much longer and more detailed Proceedings are
not, yet these documents are indispensable to gaining even partial understanding of
this Commission. Efforts to acquire these documents from the Commission have
been unavailing despite oral and written requests to the American Section for the
required designation. Eventually very brief access to these records was achieved
through the not-too-imaginative, and inadequate, procedure of borrowing them for a
brief period from the University of Washington Library, which is designated as an
approved recipient.
Cooperation otherwise has been generous, particularly that of Lewis R. Day,
Executive Secretary of ICNAF, and John L. Kask, Director of Investigations of
the IATTC. Mr. Wilvan Van Campen, Executive Director of the North Pacific
Commission, has also been helpful within the confines of the Commission policy
mentioned above.
'See generally M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASic, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER
Ir SPACE 891-96 (1963) and literature cited therein.
It is now commonly understood that questions of "capacity" may embrace both
the competence of the body as an internationally independent body and the compe-
tence to act as a legal entity within national legal systems. As is noted in the
following text discussion, this distinction is not clearly drawn in the fishing com-
mission conventions. On some occasions the basic treaty provides for international
capacity, as by referring to, or assuming, competence to conclude international
agreements, and on other occasions provision is made for capacity within a member
state, as in hiring personnel or acquiring facilities. The problem is never clearly
formulated in the various conventions nor, as noted in the text, do any of the con-
ventions deal very clearly with capacity, however it is formulated.
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the salmon agreement does not use the language of legal competence it
confers on the Commission the "power to improve spawning grounds,
construct and maintain hatcheries, rearing ponds and other such fa-
cilities as it may determine to be necessary for the propagation of
sockeye salmon in any of the waters covered by this Convention, and to
stock any such waters with sockeye salmon by such methods as it may
determine to be most desirable." Article VIII, however, dilutes the
implication of competence which appears to be so clearly conveyed by
article III by directing that the parties "acquire and place at the dis-
posal of the Commission any land within its territory required for the
construction and maintenance of hatcheries, rearing ponds, and other
such facilities as set forth in Article III." Professor Swygard reports
that within the Commission there were different opinions on the Com-
mission's competence and that one member, at least, took the position
that capacity is implied in the treaty.8 Apparently this view was re-
jected in application to a number of problems even as the Commission
in other situations acted as an independent entity. Professor Swygard
notes that the Commission had to resort to "more cumbersome devices
... to assure the necessary action"'1 and that "the lack of Commission
competence imposes definite limitations upon administration with the
substitution of cumbersome and sometimes onerous procedures.""
The Tuna Convention of 1950 is further illustration of a somewhat
indirect fashion of conferring capacity. Article 1(13), in authorizing
the Director of Investigations to disburse funds for the joint expenses
of the Commission and to arrange for "cooperation with other orga-
nizations and individuals," by implication establishes the competence
to make purchases and to enter into agreements as an independent
entity. In practice the Commission, through the Director, operates on
the assumption that its legal capacity is so established. 2
Both of the North Atlantic Commissions, ICNAF and NEAFC, are
expressly granted the capacity to enter into agreements with other
international organizations "which have related objectives" and in
8 K. Swygard, The International Halibut and Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Com-
missions: A Study in International Administration 181 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis
in University of Washington Library, 1948).
'Id. As in establishing charge accounts and chartering vessels.
20 Id.
"Id. at 182.
' Letter from Dr. John L. Kask, Director of Investigations, July 19, 1966. See
also, e.g., [1950-1951] IATTC ANN. REP. 6 (cooperative agreement with Scripps
Institution of Oceanography) ; 1952 id. at 29 (boat charter); 1954 id. at 8 (acquisition
of facilities and equipment in Panama); 1956 id. at 69; 1959 id. at 13, 82; 1961 id.
at 12 (research contracts).
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both instances it is specified that "arrangements" may be made with,
among other groups, the International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea. 3 However, in the case of ICNAF, at least, the question of
capacity to make other types of agreements became an issue. The
clearest evidence of the view that this Commission is regarded as lack-
ing even the elementary capacity to enter into some agreements is to be
found in the handling of the problem of providing a staff pension plan.
The Seventh Annual Report contains the following: 14
It was stated by Mr. Clark that because the underwriting insurance
company would be a Canadian one and subject to Canadian laws, the
Canadian legal authorities had ruled that since the Commissions them-
selves did not have legal authority to enter into a contract, Canada was
prepared to establish a corporation under the Canadian Companies Act
which would enter into a contract with the insurance company on behalf
of the Commissions.
Apparently the Commission shared this view of its capacity, for the
proposed plan was adopted.
It is not known what other circuitous means have been employed to
enable ICNAF to discharge its responsibilities under its charter. The
"rule" of the "Canadian legal authorities," mentioned above, rests
upon a highly refined and restrictive view of the convention and hardly
seems a necessary interpretation of that instrument.
So far as the United States is concerned, provision for legal capacity
of a commission within the United States is made in national legislation
for both the Tuna and Halibut Commissions. Both are designated as
"public international organizations," entitled to privileges and immuni-
ties as such, and "to the extent consistent with the instrument creating
them, possess the capacity: (a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dis-
pose of real and personal property; (c) to institute legal proceed-
ings." Apparently neither the Salmon, North Pacific nor the North-
west Atlantic Commissions are accorded a comparable designation in
Canada, the host State, although other international organizations are
given such status.
B. Membership in Commissions
Policies relevant for determining membership provisions in the fish-
ery commissions are positive and negative in nature. Effectiveness in
achieving desired goals is promoted if all states whose nationals engage
'" ICNAF Convention, art. X(1); NEAFC Convention art. 11 (1)-(2).
1[1956-1957] ICNAF ANN. REP. 11.
1-22 U.S.C. §288 (1964).
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in significant exploitation are formal participants in the machinery of
decision. Inclusive membership arrangements, open to all states di-
rectly concerned with a fishery, permit the acceptance of responsibility
by all such states and facilitate the process of imposing obligations
upon them by easing the way to accession to membership. On the
other hand, limitations upon membership to those actually and signi-
ficantly involved in a fishery avoids the hazard of participation by
those with little interest in the outcome of the decision-making process
because they are without responsibility or concern in the interaction."6
Provisions for original and subsequent membership vary greatly
among the various commissions, largely due to the historical circum-
stances attending their creation.' 7  Of the commissions examined in
this study, four operate solely in the North Pacific (though other
groups and agreements are also involved in the area) and these four
share one feature in their membership provisions that distinguishes
them from the others. The fur seal, halibut, salmon, and INPFC
agreements make provision only for original membership and none
provide for accession by other states.' On the other hand, the tuna,
ICNAF, NEAFC, and whaling agreements provide for both original
members and, with somewhat different emphasis on conditions, anti-
'" Carroz and Roche in their paper on the new Atlantic Tuna Commission state
that "of necessity" membership should be open to states adjacent to the area of fishery
operations and cite the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living
Resources both as express recognition of the interest of the coastal state and as
entitling such states "to take part on an equal footing in any system of research and
regulation for purposes of conservation in an area of the high seas adjacent to their
territorial sea irrespective of whether their nationals fish there or not." Carroz
& Roche, The New International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas in the Context of Other Intergovernmental Fishery Bodies 40-41 (unpub-
lished manuscript, 1966).
The statement in the text above would reject this position as a matter of policy.
Furthermore, as a matter of law the 1958 Convention has no compulsive effect with
respect to the very large numbers of states not parties to it, hence there would be
no obligation to admit adjacent-nonfishing states to membership in a specific
conservation organization.
'The historical circumstances include both traditional involvement by some
states and, equally traditional, noninvolvement by others. This would help explain
the distinction, noted in the text immediately below, between the Pacific agreements
and the Atlantic treaties. The former, usually closed, could have rested on the assump-
tion that no new entrants were likely in the fisheries concerned. The Atlantic
agreements were concluded in light of a different background, namely one looking to
largely open entry into the fishery since so many states were usually engaged in it.
28It is also true that the Fur Seal, Halibut, Salmon, and INPFC Conventions do
not expressly forbid new entrants, but the failure to provide for accession by other
states is probably not merely neutral in its effect. As noted in the text above, agree-
ments dealing in part with sharing of the catch, or which obviously assume that the
exploiting states are limited to a particular number, probably would need revision
to accommodate new parties. It seems unlikely that the original parties' expectations
included admission of new members to the group, unless the old agreement were
amended.
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cipate the addition of new members through time. The reasons for
this difference are not difficult to discover. The first three agreements
deal with a particular species and the parties thereto comprise the
states directly concerned with their exploitation. The INPFC agree-
ment is an effort to deal with the problem of a likely new entrant into
the halibut, salmon, and certain other fisheries and therefore it also
provides for limited membership.
On a somewhat different level, the difference in membership clauses
may be associated with the different goals sought by the commissions.
Thus each of the North Pacific Commissions attempts to deal, though
in varying ways, with limitations on access to the resource concerned.19
Efforts of this kind depend on quite specific adjustments or measures
directed at states involved in concrete situations. If new entrants into
the harvest come along, an entirely different set of adjustments or
measures would very probably be required, calling for new negotia-
tions. At the time these agreements were concluded the parties had to
deal with the existing situation in their mutual relations and it prob-
ably would have been impossible, or at least extremely complicated,
to make provision for hypothetical new entrants in the unforeseeable
future.
Whatever accounts for the membership provisions in the North
Pacific Commissions, it is now apparent that changes in patterns of
fishing exploitation may demand a new look at the older agreements.
In view of the expanded efforts by Japan and the Soviet Union to
harvest other species in the treaty area, it may no longer be satisfac-
tory to deal with conservation problems either on a species by species
basis, as is now largely the case, or on the basis of agreements with
limited and closed memberships. The new fisheries of the North Pacific
are those developed by Japan and Russia for groundfish and the har-
vest only recently sought from these resources is vastly larger in terms
of effort and volume than from the older salmon and halibut fisheries.
Yet none of the North Pacific agreements comprehend the goal of con-
servation of groundfish except INPFC, which does not include the
Soviet Union as a party.
" See text at notes 97-115 infra. The halibut agreement between Canada and the
United States does not itself deal with allocation but then this agreement does not
stand by itself either in view of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention under
which Japan is forbidden access to the halibut of the North American coast. In any
event the expectations of the framers of the halibut agreement almost certainly did
not comprehend additional entrants into the fishery nor was thought given to the
situation that would have to be faced in that circumstance. At the same time,
however, the Halibut Convention could very easily be amended to accommodate new
[ VOL. 43 :115
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Among the other commissions some slight differences in membership
provisions may be noted. There do not appear to be any technical
requirements for membership in ICNAF, but it appears safe to assume
that states adhering will be those, as stated in the preamble, which at
least share "a substantial interest in the conservation of the fishery
resources of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean .... " Another provision of
the convention stipulates that, in general, substantial exploitation is
necessary for membership on the panels which are responsible for much
of the substantive work of the Commission: this suggests that mem-
bership rests on substantial interest as evidenced by substantial ex-
ploitation of particular species in the convention area.20 These possible
interpretations of the convention are in direct contrast to requirements
of other commissions in which membership may be secured without
any exploitation, as in the Whaling Commission where few members
regularly take whales,2 or with little exploitation, as in the case of
some members of the Tuna Commission.22 The NEAFC Convention
also specifies no standards for membership; however, some exploita-
tion is no doubt required as a practical matter.2 3
Present members in most of the commissions represent the states
which engage in substantial exploitation in the areas, or for the species
concerned, but usually some nonmember fishing is prosecuted, the level
of intensity varying from negligible to substantial. The Halibut Com-
mission does not include Japan which, pursuant to the INPFC agree-
ment, is excluded from part of the halibut fishery. The Tuna Commis-
sion does not embrace Japan, although she engages in considerable
tuna fishing in the convention area in ways which affect the work of
the Commission. The minutes of the Tuna Commission's 1966 meet-
ing identify several states, the most prominent being Canada, which
now fish tuna in the eastern Pacific but who are not members of the
Commission. Indeed, this group of states is larger than that of Com-
mission members. 24
parties and in this sense it differs from the Fur Seal, Salmon, and North Pacific
Conventions.
'This requires some qualification since Panel membership is also obtainable by
contracting governments with a coastline adjacent to a subarea. ICNAF Conven-
tion, art IV.
aWhaling Convention, art. X(2) provides that any nonsignatory government
may adhere by notifying the Government of the United States.
'IATTC Convention, art. V(3) limits adherence to governments "whose na-
tionals participate in the fisheries covered by this Convention...."
'Article 15(3) states that any nonsignatory state may accede by giving notice in
writing to the Government of the United Kingdom.
The new Atlantic Tuna Convention, art. XIV(1) permits adherence by any non-
signatory which is a member of the U.N. or of any U.N. specialized agency.
'IATTC, SuMmAY OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANx. MEETING 8 (1966). A recent
19671
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It does not follow from the currently representative character of
some of the commissions that present institutions can cope with emer-
ging problems. All but two of the commissions examined here, and
those examined are by far the most significant, are concerned with
particular species, primarily fish of high unit value. Only ICNAF and
NEAFC deal with all the species of the area concerned. As fishing
intensifies around the globe and in the various convention areas, the
species sought are likely to be different from those now provided for;
this has already occurred in the North Pacific. It is likely, therefore,
that institutions with different specific interests and different member-
ships will be required to cope with the emerging difficulties.
One final point regarding membership that deserves separate men-
tion is the extent to which this form of institutional cooperation has
cut across the lines of current political dispute between major powers.
Of the three largest multilateral commissions, ICNAF, NEAFC, and
the International Whaling Commission, the Soviet Union is a member
of all three and the United States of two. It is generally agreed that
cooperation between these two states in fishery science projects has
been effective and fruitful, although it is still not sufficiently compre-
hensive.
C. Termination of Membership
All of the fishing conventions have provisions for renunciation or
withdrawal. In four instances termination of the agreement also term-
inates the commission. This would obviously follow for the two
bilateral commissions, the salmon and halibut, and it is also true for
the INPFC25 and the Fur Seal Commissions. In the case of the latter
the convention contains a built-in termination date which is effective
unless the parties take action to adopt a new agreement or extend the
old.2" The 1964 Protocol to the Fur Seal Convention extended the life
of the arrangement for another six years. In addition any party may
act to terminate the Fur Seal Commission if it believes the convention
report states that in November, 1966, Soviet trawlers left their Far Eastern ports for
fishing off Mexico Baja California where they, and vessels to come later, are ex-
pected to fish for anchovy, sardine, bluefin tuna, and mackerel. Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, Fishery Products Rep. No. 0-239 (Market News Service, Dec. 9, 1966).
' It is of some importance to note that the North Pacific agreement, concluded
in 1953, was to continue for 10 years and thereafter for one year after a party gives
notice of termination. Article XI(2). The Commission is thus maintained now on
a year-to-year basis and periodic negotiations are underway regarding treaty re-
vision. This circumstance is often thought to be responsible for the 1963 decision of
the Commission to remove halibut in the East Bering Sea from the Annex to the
Convention, thereby opening the area to Japanese fishing.
' Article XIII (4).
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obligations are not being observed by the other parties and members
are unable to agree upon the need for and nature of remedial mea-
sures.' It seems reasonably clear that under these circumstances,
where the commission has no existence except at the will of an indivi-
dual member, the body is more an extension of the members than an
independent international organization. At the same time the persons
who serve on these commissions are not merely handmaidens for other
national policy makers. The commissions serve, at least in part, as a
separate arena in which the members may work out their interrela-
tionships with respect to certain specific problems. It is because each
commission is in some respects a separate arena, with capacity to make
or influence national decisions regarding fisheries, that they merit study
as embryonic international organizations.
The Whaling, NEAFC, ICNAF, and Tuna Conventions also contain
provisions for renunciation or withdrawal, but the commissions sur-
vive any individual action by a party.2 8 Since in most instances any
action by the commission must be accepted by each member before
the action becomes effective as to it, there would seem to be no need
for renunciation or withdrawal in order to avoid substantive obliga-
tions. Withdrawals have occurred only from the Whaling Commission
and this stemmed, in the more important instances, from the periodic
inability of the various whaling states to reach agreement, indepently
of the Commission concerning the national quotas.
None of the conventions provide for expulsion or suspension of a
member, though it may be noted that membership on a panel within
ICNAF may be dependent upon payment of the financial obligations
assessed by the Commission. 9 It is also possible that this internal
membership may be altered if a state's fishing operations shift to
another region within ICNAF or out of the convention area entirely.
II. STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATION
The more general policies to be pursued in arranging the institu-
tional structure of international organizations are sometimes identified
in terms of efficiency and flexibility. Efficiency is sought by devising
' Article XII.
'Whaling Convention, art. XI; NEAFC Convention, art. 17; Northwest At-
lantic Fisheries Convention, art. XVI; IATTC Convention, art V.
'At one stage Italy withdrew from Panels 1-4 of the Northwest Atlantic Com-
mission, apparently because of failure to pay financial obligations. See text at note
83 infra. The new Atlantic Tuna Convention makes express provision for this by
suspending voting rights when a member's contributions fall in arrears for two years
or more. Article X.
19671
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
a structure that permits ready use of the personnel and facilities avail-
able to achieve the goals of the organization. Flexibility in terms of
structure embraces not only the capacity of the organization to cope
with its usual tasks, but also the capacity to adapt to unanticipated
requirements and situations. It is very difficult to discuss in the ab-
stract the task of implementing these criteria; hence policy considera-
tions are mentioned hereafter in connection with specific components
of the organizational structures of the commissions.
The internal decision-making structures of the various commissions
exhibit both close similarities and great differences. In all cases the
ultimate responsibility for exercising the most important powers con-
ferred upon the organization rests with a commission, but the composi-
tion, scope of authority and procedure of each commission differ in a
variety of ways. Typically the commission is composed of a certain
number of representatives from each state with whom are associated a
group, varying in size, of experts and advisers.
The most common characteristic of the various convention provi-
sions concerning the main body of the organization is the brevity and
lack of detail regarding its establishment. Except for the salmon
agreement, the treaties rarely go beyond specifying the number of
commissioners to be appointed by each member, leaving all other mat-
ters, such as the appointing power, tenure, remuneration, and qualifica-
tions to the members.3" This means that each party is afforded com-
plete discretion in these matters and that a very great variety of prac-
tices can be adopted by the members. On balance the organizational
discretion left to individual states is desirable. The effectiveness of
the organization in terms of acceptance of its recommendations may
depend upon the influence of the commissioners within their appointing
states. From a somewhat different perspective, members may have in-
ternal political problems which can be alleviated by astute exercise of
the appointing power. And, finally, overly precise specification of com-
missioner qualifications in the basic charter may later prove to be
unduly hampering as experience discloses the need for new types of
skills and talents. The commissioners are not, in any case, the only
delegates representing members at meetings of the organization, by
treaty or by practice; as noted above, experts and advisers also com-
monly participate.
'o Article II of the Salmon Treaty provides for both method of appointment and of
tenure.
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In the United States, the method of appointment to the various
commissions exhibits an effort to provide for participation both by
persons from the particular states involved in fisheries and occasionally
from the industry especially concerned and by government officers
officially involved with fishery resource problems. In two instances
the legislation implementing the treaties contains provision for the ap-
pointment of commissioners. The Tuna Conventions Act of 1950 pro-
vides that of the four commissioners for the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission: 3'
(a) Not more than one shall be a person residing elsewhere than in a
state whose vessels maintain a substantial fishery in the area of the con-
ventions;
(b) at least one of the Commissioners who are such legal residents shall
be a person chosen from the public at large, and who is not a salaried
employee of a state or of the Federal Government;
(c) at least one shall be an officer of the United States Fish and Wild-
life Service.
At the time of this writing the United States is represented by three
commissioners: two apparently appointed pursuant to section (b), both
being lawyers from the State of California, and one appointed under
section (c). The North Pacific Fisheries Commission is to consist of
four commissioners from each member. Of the United States Com-
missioners :32
(a) one shall be an official of the United States Government; and
(b) each of the others shall be a person residing in a State or Territory,
the residents of which maintain a substantial fishery in the Convention
area.
Somewhat similar practices have prevailed with respect to the Hali-
but and Salmon Commissioners although neither the treaties nor im-
plementing legislation so provide. Professor Swygard reports that for
both Commissions it was understood that the United States Commis-
sioner of Fisheries (now Fish and Wildlife Commissioner) would be
appointed.3" The remaining Halibut Commissioners would come from
the west coast and the Salmon Commissioners from the State of
Washington.
In the case of ICNAF, the United States Commissioners, of whom
- 16 U.S.C. § 952 (1964).
16 U.S.C. § 1022 (1964).
' Swvygard, supra note 8, at 142-46 sets out the political background for these de-
cisions.
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there can be three, have uniformly consisted of a representative of the
Fish and Wildlife Service, a representative from the Massachusetts or
Maine state fishery departments, and a third representing the east coast
fishing industry.
Though in certain instances the identity of the commissioners may
be crucial, provision for the employment of experts and advisers either
formally in the commissions or in practice, reduces their importance.
The experts and advisers are not authorized to vote in commission
deliberations of course, but in the nature of the rather widescale in-
vestigative enterprise, comprising much of the commissions' functions,
it is inevitable they play an influential role in the basic work of the
group. This is not to say, of course, that experts and advisers deter-
mine commission decisions, but they do influence them heavily.
A. Officers of Commissions
Most, but not all, the treaties call for the electing of officers from
among commission members appointed by the various governments.
Neither the halibut nor salmon agreements so provide, but in practice,
under the rules established by the commissions, a chairman and vice-
chairman are selected. Apparently, in the Salmon Commission, as in
other cases, the officers alternate between the states concerned.3 4 The
reason for the uncertainty implied by the term "apparently" is that in
this instance, as in many others, the Reports of the Salmon Commission
are near perfect models of brevity. Although frequently the reports
make no reference to the identity of the officers, it is assumed that the
principle of alternating nationalities is followed here too. (The Com-
mission rules of procedure do not seem to be available to the public.3 5)
NEAFC has a unique arrangement. The treaty provides that the
President and two Vice Presidents need not be chosen from either the
commissioners or from their experts or advisers. Moreover, if the
President is chosen from a delegation "he shall forthwith cease to act
as a member of that Delegation, and if a Commissioner has been
elected the State concerned shall have the right to appoint another per-
son to serve in his place."3
As will be seen below, the officers of the various commissions are
not in pivotal positions, but they do on occasion have certain special
competences.
Id. at 165.
The annual reports do not include the text of the rules. Possibly the rules are
one of the details of operation, referred to in note 5 supra, about which information
must be sought directly from the member governments.
" NEAFC Convention, art. 3 (3).
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B. Committees
It would be exceedingly tedious, and just as unrewarding, to enter
into detailed discussion of the employment of committees by the com-
missions. Committees are, no doubt, not of equal use to the various
commissions, and are not of particular importance to the Tuna, Sal-
mon, and Halibut Commissions which have a permanent staff. For the
commissions without staffs there are, of course, no continuing organs
within the structure of the groups which can pursue the complex
problems of research and investigation either of which is the main pur-
pose of the organization or provides the basis for its work. It is under-
standable then that there is a proliferation of committees, working
groups, special assemblies of scientists, and so on, through which the
members plan research programs, analyze results, formulate reports,
and devise recommendations. In addition, the rather awesome scale
of scientific work required of some commissions, such as INPFC and
ICNAF, makes it imperative that a large number of people be engaged,
with qualifications much more diverse than those the commissioners
possess. For most of the commissions, moreover, it is likely that the
task of most, but not all, committees is essentially scientific in nature.
The most notable exception is INPFC. Here the problems faced by
the Commission are, or at least have been made to be, heavily tinged
with political considerations, being concerned not only with the gather-
ing and examination of data for the purpose of identifying physical
conditions in the fishery, but also with decisions about who gets access
to what resource.3 7
The makeup and use of the committee device in the commissions are
observably influenced by the task assigned to the committees. For
example, the ICNAF agreement projects two basic standing commit-
tees for conducting its business, a Finance and Administration Com-
mittee and a Research and Statistics Committee. But provisions for
membership differ. For the former, each government is represented by
a commissioner who may be assisted by experts and advisers.3" The
latter committee is composed of a nominee from each government, not
necessarily a commissioner, who is assisted by experts and advisers and
by observers from noncontracting governments and from FAO and
ICES.39 The reason for the difference in composition lies, in all proba-
bility, in the distinct functions served. Finance and Administration is
' See text at notes 175-76 infra.
'Rules of Procedure for the Commission, Rule 16(b), ICNAF HANDBoo 43-44
(1965).
Rule 23(c), id. at 44.
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concerned with the internal problems of the Commission, whereas Re-
search and Statistics deals with substantive problems regarding research
in the convention area. For the Research and Statistics Committee,
then, more effective operation calls for drawing upon all those who may
be concerned with the area, and who might contribute, whether they are
from a nonmember state or from another international organization
with similar responsibilities in the same area.
When the focus or emphasis of a committee's work has a substantial
political content it is to be expected that those with ultimate authority
on the commission will play a major role. This may be illustrated by
the makeup of the two committees established by INPFC to deal with
issues posed in its basic charter. The Ad Hoc Committee on the
Protocol, concerned with shifting the line which determines the area of
Japanese abstention from high seas fishing for salmon, was given the
task of considering "application of the results of research to adjust-
ments of the provisional lines in accordance with the terms of the
Protocol."4 It is entirely clear from the annual reports that the task
of this committee was conceived to be delicate, at least in the initial
stages of its work. The committee was to consist of one member from
each section assisted by experts or advisers, but "with the understand-
ing that the group shall be kept small."41 More significantly it was
explicitly provided that "Records shall be kept and distributed on a
confidential basis. 2 After the committee met during the 1958 annual
meeting, its report to the Commission "was dealt with.. .on an in
camera basis and its contents have not been given general distribu-
tion."43 In this context it merits notice that both the United States and
Canada always had two commissioners designated as participants in
this committee, one listed as "commissioner-adviser," while Japan
placed all four commissioners on it, using the "commissioner-adviser"
designation for three of them.44
4" 1958 INPFC ANN. REP. 8. The terms of reference adopted at the 1958 meeting
included the following:
The Committee shall study and consider the results of scientific investigations
referred to it by the Commission for the purpose of recommending to the
Commission, as expeditiously as practicable, what action, if any, may be de-
sirable or necessary for the discharge of the responsibilities set forth in the
Protocol.
Id. at 9.
41 Id. at 8.
42 Id.
13 Id. at 9.
"See e.g., 1960 INPFC ANN. RElP. 17. In 1959 the Commission noted that it was
unable to reach agreement on what the Protocol to the Convention meant in its
instructions as to how the intermingling salmon stocks of the North Pacific
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The Ad Hoc Committee on Abstention also had a major political role
to fulfill, and all three states made intensive use of the "commissioner-
adviser" category, reaching a high point in 1964 when each party
placed all four commissioners on this committee 5 This experience is
in direct contrast to the pattern of membership in the Standing Com-
mittee on Biology and Research where very seldom is more than one
commissioner a member of the committee. The point to be noticed is
that, in major part, the Commission did not wish to delegate any
responsibility to a subsidiary committee composed substantially of
experts or advisers, who may be scientists and have a particular
orientation because of that fact. Instead the Commission converted
the ad hoc committee deliberations into virtually a regular Commission
meeting." It is perhaps reasonable to speculate that this practice ap-
peared desirable when the issues involved the "interpretation" of re-
search results for the purpose of implementing fundamental provisions
in the original treaty, provisions that were heavily tinged from the
beginning with sensitive political considerations, and that such "inter-
pretations" were deeply influenced by political factors including the ex-
pediency, timing, form and detailed content of the decisions to be made.
C. Staff
By far the major organizational difference among the commissions
is the existence of a permanent staff in three of the species organiza-
tions in contrast to the wholly decentralized research work in all of the
others. In accounting for this it would be ingenuous to deny that in the
Salmon, Halibut, and Tuna Commissions the United States plays a
major, but not dominant, role47 and that in two cases there was a
Ocean should be divided. Therefore, during the Sixth Annual Meeting on
November 7, 1959, the members of the Commission agreed to inform the
Contracting Parties that they had been unable to arrive at an agreed interpre-
tation of the intent of the Protocol to the Convention. They requested the
Contracting Parties to provide them with a single agreed interpretation as soon
as practicable. No such interpretation has come forth.
1964 INPFC ANx. REP. 4. In view of the negotiations over revision of the basic
treaty it is doubtful if any such interpretation can be expected except in that
context.
.5 1964 INPFC ANN. REP. 21. Under art. 111(1) (a) the Commission shall "in
regard to any stock of fish specified in the Annex, study for the purpose of deter-
mining annually whether such stock continues to qualify for abstention under the
provisions of Article IV." The Ad Hoc Committee was established to assist in
implementation of this Commission function by making recommendations to it
regarding these annual determinations. 1958 INPFC ANN. REP. 11.
"O It is relevant to note in this connection that the Commission itself is not com-
posed wholly of scientists or even in substantial part. The U.S. Commissioners in
1965, for example, included two lawyers, a college president, and one federal fisheries
official.
,
7 In the first two cases the United States and Canada are equal parties, including
the sharing of costs, while in the Tuna Commission the United States pays much
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widespread, if slowly developed, consensus among those concerned on
the need for action. Perhaps of even more importance, neither the
salmon nor the halibut agreements explicitly provide for employment of
a permanent staff, suggesting that the appropriate approach was left to
local decision, in which local interests played a determinative role in
deciding to use this device. It is doubtful if this can be said of the
Tuna Commission except in the sense that it was felt to be in the in-
terest of the United States, Costa Rica, and any other Latin American
state which might become a member, to rely upon a genuine interna-
tional body for scientific research rather than upon one responsible
only to the United States. For in direct contrast to the situation per-
taining in the salmon and halibut fisheries, in this instance, only the
United States could conduct research if such work was left to each
member to perform. At that time there simply were few if any trained
marine scientists in the other American nations concerned with the
eastern tropical tuna and bait fishes and it would have been hypocrisy to
conclude a treaty which depended upon research by national agencies.
In this instance, then, the notion of an international staff includes even
an element of international education as well as the more substantive
preference for objective scientific investigation. It may be noted,
incidentally, that this feature of the Tuna Commission staff has been
executed on a truly grand scale; staff members are recruited from
around the globe, thus facilitating the spread of sophisticated marine
biologists to places needing such highly trained specialists.
Whatever the motivating factor4" it is surely significant that per-
manent staffs are utilized in what are, or were in the beginning, essen-
tially very limited regional agreements among states with a clearly
identifiable common interest in an easily identifiable fishery. If any
two states in the world could mutually repose confidence in an inter-
national staff they are the United States and Canada. This is not to
suggest that agreement in the Halibut and Salmon Commissions is
necessarily easy to achieve, but the fact is that these two states have
so many general common interests, in addition to their shared concern
over a specific resource, that it was not surprising they were able to
concur in creating an international staff with the responsibility of
dealing with rather specific and limited scientific and engineering
the largest share of the budget since the formula for determining contributions refers
to payment based on the proportion of the total catch utilized by each party.
'It may be important to inquire concerning the expected impact of Commission
decisions on access to the fishery and on revenue therefrom since this expectation
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problems. Of course, even here the staff does not command-each
government retains ultimate control over commission actions. None-
theless, staff recommendations are probably given heavy, if not de-
cisive, weight in determining commission actions; this situation alone
would normally impede even the delegation of specific scientific tasks
to the group because it is not wholly under exclusive national control.
Other considerations regarding these specialized situations also sug-
gest that prospects for centralizing research responsibilities in future
commissions may not be promising. In the case of both the Halibut
and Salmon Commissions it was firmly believed, on all sides, that cer-
tain definite actions were required if the fisheries were to be rebuilt
and maintained. Recognition in the halibut industry of the need for
rather drastic measures was built up over a very considerable period
of time and the Commission's authority to take measures was only
gradually expanded.49 The Commission was authorized, and expected
to exercise, detailed regulatory power which required for efficient exe-
cution a rather tight administrative setup, including staff. If any-
thing, the Salmon Commission exemplifies this set of circumstances
in even more drastic form.5" Before the Commission could take any
action, it was to be preceded by eight years of study. And when the
requirements for action were ascertained, it was clear that very de-
tailed supervision of the fishery was required. In neither case was it
feasible to rely upon wholly independent research efforts, with the
necessity for coordination and, possibly, for eventually negotiated
agreement on findings. In contrast to other commissions, for whom an
annual meeting is usually sufficient, the Salmon Commission must
convene frequently and during the season may meet more than once a
week. Without a staff organization a commission with such immediate
responsibilities would find it extremely difficult to operate effectively.
Although neither the Salmon nor Halibut Commissions make explicit
provisions for a staff, the context in which these groups were created
suggests that use of a scientific staff was implicit in the new interna-
tional arrangements. Both agreements were successfully concluded
only after years, or decades, of agitation, recrimination, and political
may affect the initial choice of whether to establish an independent staff. It may
be hypothesized that the lesser the impact expected the more likely the parties'
willingness to concur in the creation of an independent staff. Whether or not this
factor is operative and the degree of its importance, would require more intensive
analysis than assayed in this paper. Financial considerations are, it is clear, one of
the significant influences bearing on the choice not to create an independent staff.
" Swygard, supra note 8, at 97-107.51 Id. at 107-35.
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maneuvering, although it was widely recognized that action based upon
scientific investigations to be conducted by the commissions was vitally
necessary. This is especially notable in the case of the Salmon Com-
mission. It is hardly conceivable that the expectations of the treaty
framers, let alone of the groups most immediately affected, could have
been satisfied without the work of a full-time professional staff.
The professional staff of the Tuna Commission stands in contrast to
those previously mentioned precisely because of the need for regulatory
measures to be clarified. It was thought wise to achieve clarification
by creating an international staff to undertake the necessary work.
The important factor here appears to center on the political context,
especially the traditional relations between the United States and its
neighbors to the south. Removing the research arm of the Commission
from any national affiliation was, in such a context, a requirement of
effective action, whatever the action turned out to be.
The importance of the above considerations was sufficient to over-
come the reluctance of national officials to establish a research agency
which is not only beyond national control but which may divert finan-
cial resources from agencies which are subject to such control. Ap-
parently such considerations are seldom encountered and it is difficult
to discern any current desire on the part of national fishery officials
to establish international and independent fishing research agencies.
The latest international commission, that on Atlantic tuna, makes no
provision for a staff despite the fact that the IATTC is an outstanding
illustration of the value of such an arrangement.
D. Advisory Committees
Several of the fishery commissions employ advisory groups as part
of their total structure, pursuant either to direct provision in the basic
charter or to decision by the commission. This use of advisory bodies
composed of persons drawn from the various segments in the industry
is an obvious recognition of the political problems involved in achieving
effective implementation of commission objectives." The actions of
the two earliest commissions testify to the very practical considera-
tions confronted. Although the 1931 Halibut Treaty did not mention
advisory groups, it is reported by Professor Swygard that "the first act
"There is also, apparently, realization of the value of the advisory committee
device as a means of enlisting cooperation from the industry in carrying out the
work of the Commission. Such assistance may be most helpful, for example, in
persuading vessel owners and crews to take action which facilitates performance of
the Commission's tasks.
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of the Halibut Commission under the 1931 Treaty was the establish-
ment of a Conference Board appointed from the fleet."52 The func-
tions served by the board were summarized by the Halibut Commission
Chairman as follows: 13
to provide information which the commission may require, other than
that it shall itself gather; aid in the formulation and application of regu-
lations; discuss the facts and reasoning upon which regulations are based,
and communicate same to the members of their associations. The board
is to meet in its entirety or in sections with the commission or its director
of investigations at such times as may be desired; formal meetings to be
held during the winter slack season.
The annual reports of the Halibut Commission do not offer a detailed
picture of its relationship with the Board, leaving little basis for obser-
vation from this viewpoint, but it seems fairly evident that through
the Board major segments of the industry have had full opportunity to
make known their views regarding appropriate regulations and to ad-
vance recommendations. Some interested groups may not be on the
Board at all and others may not be represented accurately. In 1949 the
Board, according to the Commission, gave "considerable support" to a
Commission proposed method for splitting the fishing season into a
number of successive open and closed periods. 4 However, when the
matter was "referred to the various fleets and to other interested par-
ties for further consideration," so much opposition was discovered that
the Commission deferred action. 5
The salmon convention itself did not mention an advisory group but
t' Swygard, supra note 8, at 187.
Id. at 188
t' 1949 IPHC ANN. REP. 9.
'Id. Public hearings were held at the end of the fishing season and the Com-
mission's report states that vessel owners, fishermen, and most halibut dealers favored
splitting the season. "However, the particular split season proposal developed at the
January meeting of the Conference Board, involving a succession of open and
closed periods applied simultaneously to all boats, received little support from fisher-
men, vessel owners or dealers in all ports." Id.
The extent of the Commission's relations with industry groups is evident from
the following which appears in 1953 IPHC Aim. REP. at 9-10:
During the morning of January 21, the results of investigations conducted
during 1952 and the statistics of the fishery and the effectiveness of regulation
in 1952 were reviewed. In the afternoon, representatives of the Washington
State otter trawlers and of a liver processor were heard on matters relative to
their interest in the fishery. Thereafter, the status of current appropriations and
plans for investigations in 1953 were presented by the staff to the Commission
and discussed.
On the second day, January 22, the Commission held a joint meeting with
representatives of fleets and dealers and reviewed the previous season's fishing
and the results of investigations. In the afternoon, one meeting was held with
representatives of the Pacific coast halibut dealers and another with the fleet's
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the United States Senate in consenting to ratification attached (on the
insistence of the Governor of the State of Washington) 6 a reservation
requiring the Commission to establish such a body. Described as an
"understanding" and embodied in the Protocol of Exchange, the reser-
vation stated: 5
7
That the Commission shall set up an Advisory Committee composed of
six persons from each country who shall be representatives of the various
branches of the industry... [purse seine, gill net, troll, sport fishing, and
one other], which Advisory Committee shall be invited to all non-execu-
tive meetings of the Commission and shall be given full opportunity to
examine and to be heard on all proposed orders, regulations or recom-
mendations.
The annual reports indicate that this understanding has been fully
implemented, for the committee appears to have very close contact
with the Commission."8 Indeed the intimacy of the consultation be-
tween these groups, the regulators and the regulated, might in other
settings raise questions about the propriety of the arrangement.59
Be this as it may, the point to be emphasized here is that in the inten-
sely political context in which the salmon and halibut agreements were
evolved the desirability of adopting the advisory group device can
hardly be questioned, especially since both commissions came to pos-
sess very considerable effective regulatory power over the fisheries."0
representatives to receive and discuss recommendations for the regulation of the
fishery in 1953.
On January 23, the Commission considered the industry's proposals, agreed
upon the regulations to be recommended to the two governments for 1953 and
made other administrative decisions.
Swygard, supra note 8, at 130-31.
' Article V of the 1957 Pink Salmon Protocol, amending the 1930 Convention,
enlarged the Advisory Committee to six members.
'The following account, which appears in 1960 IPSFC Az,-N. REP. 4, is repre-
sentative:
The tentative recommendations for regulatory control of the sockeye and pink
salmon fishery in Convention waters, as submitted to the Advisory Committee
on December 11, 1959, were discussed and certain revisions made on the basis
of the presentations of the Committee. The revised regulations recommended
for the 1960 sockeye and pink salmon fishery in Convention waters were ap-
proved in part with the daily opening and closing times for Canadian purse
seine and gill net fishing in Juan de Fuca Strait being held in abeyance sub-
ject to further recommendations by the Advisory Committee.
The first sentence above is apparently a standard description and is commonly found
in the annual reports.
" Perhaps this needs emphasis. The point is that there are frequently, in other
contexts, conflicts between the interests of the regulated groups and the public
interest, including the interest of the consumer and that an explicit method for
protecting this larger interest often is desirable.
"'However, in 1953 IPSFC Ax-\. REP. 6, the Salmon Commission calls attention
to its reluctance to exercise the power conferred in the 1937 agreement:
National sovereignty has not been encroached upon. In fact the Commission has
refrained from making regulations in Convention waters except on the High
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The ICNAF, INPFC, and tuna agreements all contain provision for
an advisory group and so far as the United States is concerned the
implementing legislation prescribes for various details, including the
general criteria for appointment, terms of office, and privileges.61 The
advisory groups in these instances differ, however, from those for the
Salmon and Halibut Commissions in that the latter are composed of
representatives of the industry from both parties. The former agree-
ments envisage not one advisory group drawn from the various parties
but a separate body from each state, or national section with each
national section having an advisory body composed of its own na-
tionals. The historical background of the Salmon and Halibut Com-
missions and the interrelationship of an international industry fishing
the same resource in the same area no doubt offers explanation for
this evolution.
The significance of the advisory group device in the practice of
ICNAF, INPFC, and IATTC is difficult to assess from the reports
of these bodies, but it probably differs from one to another and per-
haps from time to time within any one group. In addition the annual
reports do not clearly indicate how many states in these groups have
actually appointed advisory committees. The United States has ap-
pointed a committee for all three but Canada appears to have a com-
mittee for only ICNAF and not for INPFC.62 So far as the other
states are concerned, and also in relation to the United States practice,
it should be emphasized that in most instances the fishery commission
agreements, or rules of procedure adopted by the commission, provide
another method for assuring that the various interested segments of
the fishing industry are apprised of, and enabled to play a part in, the
Seas where control is not possible except by such regulations. Regulation has
been accomplished during the past eight years through the process of recom-
mending regulations to the respective governments. When the recommenda-
tions are accepted the regulations become of national concern and bear the ap-
proval of each respective government representing its respective nationals.
In this way the recommendations for regulation are a matter of international
as well as national concern but the actual regulations are of national concern
only because they are made as well as enforced by the individual governments.
In this way national sovereignty has been maintained beyond the specifica-
tions of the Convention.
The 1957 Protocol, in art. III, limits even the formal regulatory authority of the
Commission.
'
1Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C. §983 (1964); North
Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954, 16 U.S.C. § 1023 (1964); Tuna Convention Act of
1950, 16 U.S.C. § 953 (1964).
'Apparently the reason for this lies in the internal political situation. Japan
also names an advisory committee for its section of the North Pacific Commission.
However, the Japanese advisory group is not formally organized.
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developments within the commission. Three of the treaties, ICNAF,
NEAFC, and the International Whaling Convention, directly antici-
pate participation of advisers and experts, accompanying the commis-
sioners,"3 while the North Pacific Commission provides for advisers
and experts in its rules of procedure" and the Tuna Commission in
practice permits advisers, experts and observers to attend meetings."
The Halibut and Salmon Commission reports refer to meetings held in
conjunction with their advisory committees and also with large num-
bers of interested industry people," but it is impossible from the
reports to discover whether other advisers or experts are present at
executive sessions or at less public gatherings."7 Neither of the commis-
sions publishes a roster of participants at regular meetings although
the Salmon Commission lists members of the advisory committee.
The device of placing industry members as advisers seems to be
most frequently used by the United States and Canada in ICNAF.
According to the treaty, representatives of the advisory committees
may, with the consent of the appointing government, attend, as ob-
servers, nonexecutive meetings of the Commission or of any panel in
which their government participates." The reports do not indicate
that either the American or Canadian committees are inclined to take
advantage of this provision though infrequently they are listed as
"observers." These committee members do frequently attend meetings,
however, as advisers, possibly because of the distinction between "ob-
server" and "advisers" in Commission rules. The classification of a
person as "observer" or "adviser" does not have any discernible effect
upon the scope of his participation in Commission meetings, since in
either case he is only permitted to speak. But apparently the designa-
tion may affect which meeting a person is entitled to attend. Advisory
committee members are restricted in attendance, as a matter of right, to
nonexecutive Commission and panel sessions, while "advisers" and "as-
sistant advisers" do not appear to be so confined."' Despite this
rather amorphous practice the ICNAF annual reports indicate that in
'ICNAF Convention, art. 11(2); NEAFC Convention, art. 3(2); Whaling
Convention, art. III(1).
' Rules of Procedure for the Commission, Rule 6, INPFC HANDBOOK 30.
'See generally the mimeographed summary minutes of the annual meetings which
list the experts and advisers in attendance.
'See notes 54 and 57 supra.
' The fair implication of the language in the reports is that outsiders attend
only those meetings designated as open to them.
' ICNAF Convention, art. V(1).
'There is nothing in the treaty on this.
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one instance, the United States Advisory Committee was responsible
for presentation of a recommendation to a panel."
In INPFC the role of the advisory committee in one particular
instance assumed some political significance, indicating (somewhat
weakly) the usefulness of the device. When the decision of the Com-
mission was made to recommend removal of the halibut stocks of the
East Bering Sea from the annex of the treaty,71 with the object of
freeing the Japanese from their obligation to abstain from fishing this
species in this area, the not unexpected result was a furor in the halibut
fishing industry. It was no surprise, further, that for a number of
reasons the reverberations extended to Washington, inspiring hearings
by the Senate Committee on Commerce, jointly with the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, to consider this recommen-
dation.72 In the course of the hearing, statements were made that the
Commission decision came as a great surprise both to Congress and to
the fishing industry.73 Perhaps it did. If so, the blame could hardly
be placed upon the Commission, for testimony in the hearings, by
commissioners and by members of the advisory committee, made it
completely clear that the advisory committee had conferred with the
Commission several times and at length regarding this particular prob-
lem74 and made a recommendation from which but three members dis-
sented. Although these facts came out in the hearing, they were some-
what muted by the loud charge of secrecy and undue haste asserted
"' ICNAF, REP. OF FiRST AN. MEETING 7 (1951).
'The Annex provides, in relevant part, as follows:
1. With regard to the stocks of fish named below, Japan agrees to abstain from
fishing, and Canada and the United States of America agree to continue to
carry out necessary conservation measures, in accordance with the provisions
of Article V, Section 2 of this Convention:
(a) Halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepsis)
The Convention area off the coasts of Canada and the United States of
America in which commercial fishing for halibut is being or can be
prosecuted. Halibut referred to herein shall be those originating along
the coasts of North America.
"'Joint Hearings on the East Bering Sea Halibut Fishery Before the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce and the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
'Id. at 2, 10 (Senator Magnuson), 74-75 (Mr. John Wedin), 80-81 (Senator
Magnuson).7
"Id. at 16, 21 (Mr. Edward Allen, Commissioner), 45 (George Johansen, Secre-
tary-Treasurer, Alaska Fishermen's Union, Member of the Advisory Committee),
134 (Mr. Harold Lokken, Manager, Fishing Vessel Owners Association, Member of
the Advisory Committee).
It is difficult to capture the flavor of these hearings in a few words. Suffice to
say that statements in support of the Commission's procedure are lost in the mass
of unfavorable comment. The same may be said for the facts about relations between
the Commission and its advisory committee in this particular instance.
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against the Commission. This relative lack of emphasis on the facts of
consultation and thorough use of the mechanism established for the
purpose perhaps is seen in better perspective in light of the following
circumstance: two members of the advisory committee testified and
mentioned, very briefly, their participation in committee meetings on
the issue and one of them, Mr. Harold E. Lokker, was the manager of
the Fishing Vessels Owners Association which, he stated, "has been
in... the halibut business, since 1914."" 5 Seemingly, one might fairly
conclude, it was just as well, from the viewpoint of all concerned, not to
ventilate matters too thoroughly. In short, in this instance at least,
the advisory committee served a useful dual function: It (1) insulated
the Commission from premature industry pressure and (2) established
for the record that a definite consultative procedure had been fully
and faithfully employed. Despite the political rhetoric in the hearings
the latter was made convincingly apparent. If the fishery commis-
sions of the future more frequently engage in decision-making with
political repercussions, this experience should convey some very use-
ful, if subtle, lessons.
E. Decentralization of Functions
As fishing practices expand around the world and change with inno-
vations in boats, gear, and processing operations, efforts at community
regulation may similarly expand and change. As new or transformed
international regulatory mechanisms are created, one emphasis may
be upon regional groupings designed to cope with fishery problems in
large ocean areas encompassing multinational exploitation of many
different stocks of fish. In this context it may be desirable to provide
mechanisms for decentralizing activities within a particular organiza-
tion so that the problems unique to a particular subarea may be
resolved most efficiently yet as part of the entire context. 76 Existing
methods for such decentralization could serve as guides for these pos-
sible developments.
A major structural element in two commissions, ICNAF and
NEAFC, and an innovation in conservation regimes, is the establish-
ment of subsidiary bodies with certain responsibilities regarding the
fisheries in identifiable portions, or subareas, of the entire convention
area. For example, the ICNAF Convention defines a precise boundary
7 Id. at 129.
70 It is not only in this context that methods of decentralization could be useful.
The Atlantic Tuna Convention, concluded in May, 1966, is concerned solely with
tuna and tuna-like fishes but in article VI the Commission is authorized to
"establish Panels on the basis of species, group of species, or of geographic areas."
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for the area to which it applies7 7 and also, in an annex, subdivides this
area into five subareas for which panels are to be established by the
contracting governments. 7  The initial composition of each panel is
specified in the annex. The convention stipulates that after two years
the Commission is to make an annual review of panel representation
and "shall have the power, in consultation with the panel concerned,
to determine representation on each panel. .... 79 Representation is
determined by (1) current substantial exploitation in the subarea con-
cerned of fishes of the cod group, of flat-fishes, and of rosefish, and (2)
whether a contracting government has a coastline adjacent to a sub-
area. In practice the Commission does review panel composition an-
nually and on occasion it has exercised its authority. At its fifth annual
meeting the Commission requested its Executive Secretary "to submit
to the Iceland Government the Commission's wish that Iceland, play-
ing a considerable role in the fishery and research work in subarea 1,
take membership in Panel 1."10 Iceland had ratified the convention
prior to the first meeting of the Commission and therefore had a right
to membership from that time, but it had not sought panel membership
until this expression of the Commission's desires. At the next annual
meeting, the sixth, Iceland applied, and was accepted, for membership
in Panel 1.81 At the same meeting the United Kingdom applied for
membership on Panel 4, but after discussion withdrew its application
"in view of the lack of substantial exploitation."8 " Certain questions
arose later about Italian compliance with its financial obligations to the
organization and in 1959 after several years membership on Panels
1-4, Italy withdrew from all panels.83 In 19601961 Italy was again
represented on Panels 3 and 4.
The panels were apparently regarded as so important an element of
the ICNAF structure that special rules of procedure were provided
for them. 4 Each panel is authorized, in accordance with convention
article IV, to adopt its own rules of procedure and, indeed, the United
' Article I defines the convention area, which excludes territorial waters, in
terms of degrees and minutes of longitude and latitude.
'8 The subareas are also defined with precision. Although not provided for in the
treaty, each subarea is further subdivided for statistical purposes.
Article IX(2).
[1954-1955] ICNAF ANN. REP. 10.
[1955-1956] id. at 9.
s' Id. at 14.
r The administrative report for the year ending June 30, 1958 shows Italy in
arrears in the sum of $10,961.42, representing two years' contribution. [1957-
1957] id. at 9. This increased to $16,751.11 a year later and at the 9th annual meeting
the reported Panel memberships do not include Italy. [1958-1959] id. at 11.
I ICNAF HANDBOOK at 47.
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States advised the Commission that it had no authority to promulgate
panel rules.85 As it turned out the Commission recommended uniform
rules spelling out the basic structure and method of functioning for the
panels and these were approved by all five panels.8 6
In addition to government representation on the panel by commis-
sioners assisted by experts or advisers, the panel rules provide that the
advisory committees, which each government is entitled to appoint,
may be represented by "observers" at certain panel meetings, namely
the "nonexecutive" meetings.87 The presence of these observers is
conditioned upon the assent of the contracting government concerned
and upon notice to the Executive Secretary by the commissioners of
the names of advisory committee members authorized to attend the
panel meetings. 8 That advisory committees may have definite impact
on panel work is evident from the first report of the Commission which
records that Panel 4 received a recommendation from the United
States Commissioners "on behalf of their Advisory Committee. 89
Each panel elects a chairman for a term of two years. Under the
rules the chairman may be re-elected but not for successive terms.
Should the chairmanship become vacant a replacement is elected at the
next panel meeting to serve for the unexpired period of the term. Ap-
parently this means the new chairman may not be re-elected at the
next regular meeting of the panel.
According to the rules of procedure the panels may employ such
committees as they need. In practice panels not only name committees
but also utilize "groups of advisers" who furnish scientific reports re-
quired by the panels to discharge their responsibilities with respect to
the fisheries concerned. The annual reports indicate that the work of
the panels and their discussions are based upon reports submitted by
advisory groups.9
The scheme for decentralization within NEAFC, although similar to
that of ICNAF, differs in certain important particulars. The conven-
tion area is divided into three regions, described in the annex. A re-
ICNAF, REP. OF FIRST ANN. MEETING 5 (1951). The question arose because it
was thought desirable to combine rules of procedure for both the Commission and the
Panel. The Commission agreed that under the convention it had no authority over
Panel rules.6 Id. at 5, 7.
Rule 2, id. at 47 (1965). The convention so provides in art. V.
* Id.
ICNAF, REP OF FIRST ANN. MEETING 7 (1951).
'OEach annual report contains a section on reports of meetings of panels. Better
evidence of the importance of the scientific advisers is in the Proceedings of the
annual meetings where formal reports of such meetings are appended to each panel
report. See, e.g., ICNAF, PROC. 15TH ANN. MEETING 1965.
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gional committee, whose composition is determined by the Commission,
is established for each region. 91 Any contracting state is entitled to
representation on such a committee if it has an adjacent coastline, or
exploits the fisheries therein, or exploits a stock elsewhere which is
fished within the region.92 In contrast to ICNAF, any degree of ex-
ploitation, whether or not substantial, suffices for membership on a
committee. Also in contrast, the regional committees have far less
autonomy and responsibility. The Commission decides upon com-
mittee rules of procedure as well as upon its "terms of reference."
The decentralizing arrangements described not only focus special
responsibility on particular groups within the commissions but in one
instance, that of ICNAF, the panel members are afforded a special
competence vis-a-vis other members. Under present article VIII, if a
particular panel recommends to the Commission that a certain measure
be taken regarding its subarea and the Commission transmits this
recommendation as a proposal to the depository government for cir-
culation to all contracting governments, 93 the proposal can become
effective as to all such governments so long as the panel members'
governments signify acceptance. (A 1964 amendment, not yet in ef-
fect, reverses this procedure by requiring governments to signify ob-
jection, but this does not affect the point made here."4) This means
that non-panel governments cannot escape the regulatory measure by
failing to accept it, should their fishermen use the subarea concerned.
Of course, for proposals affecting the convention area as a whole the
acceptance of all governments is necessary. This latter procedure
would be altered by the 1964 amendment so that a proposal regarding
the whole area is effective, without more, as to all nonobjecting gov-
ernments unless the objectors constitute a majority of all contracting
governments.
The North Pacific Convention also contains a certain special de-
cision-making competence for two of the states concerned and this,
as with the arrangements just described, rests on the notion that those
especially affected should be given consideration in the decision-making
NEAFC Convention, arts. 1(2), 5.
"
2Article 5(2).
' The Commission itself is not in direct communication with the members,
but acts through the United States, as the depository Government. The latter
Government also has a special authority in this connection. Article VIII(6) per-
mits the depository Government in transmitting proposals to members, to "make
such suggestions as will facilitate acceptance of the proposals."
" Protocol to the Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to
the Entry into Force of Proposals Adopted by the Commission, ICNAF HANDBOOK
at 35.
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process. Here, however, the impact of the decision extends only to
those participating in it. Article III (1) provides, inter alia, that the
Commission shall:
(c) in regard to an
, 
stock of fish in the Convention area;
(i) Study, on request of any Contracting Party concerned, any stock
of fish which is under substantial exploitation by two or more of the
Contracting Parties, and which is not covered by a conservation agree-
ment between such parties existing at the time of the conclusion of the
Convention, for the purpose of determining need for joint conservation
measures;
(ii) Decide and recommend necessary joint conservation measures in-
cluding any relaxation thereof to be taken as a result of such study. Pro-
vided, however, that only the national sections of the Contracting Parties
engaged in substantial exploitation of such stock of fish may participate
in such decision and recommendation. The decisions and recommenda-
tions shall be reported regularly to all the Contracting Parties, but shall
apply only to the Contracting Parties the national section of which par-
ticipated in the decisions and recommendations.
F. Advisers and Experts
In earlier discussion it was noted that in most fishery commissions
the official government representatives at meetings include a body of
advisers and experts. Although for the most part these advisory per-
sonnel are not separately organized within the commission structure in
the form of independent committees, on occasion they are so employed,
For example, in the ICNAF structure the scientific advisers to the
various panels are a regular component of the organization, with
elected officers and agenda, and reports of these are included in the
proceedings of the annual ICNAF meetingY Within other commis-
sions the advisers also play a major role, particularly in staffing the
innumerable ad hoc committees, subcommittees, and special working
groups. In general these advisers are drawn from government scien-
tists or persons with responsibility for fisheries matters within govern-
ment agencies. However, as indicated above, occasionally advisers are
not technical or scientific personnel but persons representing various
phases of the fishing industry. 6 This pattern appears to be especially
prominent in ICNAF but occasionally the same procedure is employed
for representation in other commissions. So long as it is understood, as
See note 89 supra.
"
6 As in many other instances the various commissions differ in the way they
report upon this matter. ICNAF tends to identify the background of experts and
advisers in the listing carried in each annual report. INPFC, on the other hand,
offers no such details.
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it no doubt is, that assistance from persons potentially affected by the
regulatory process is not necessarily disinterested this practice is prob-
ably without undue risk to the general interest and perhaps contri-
butes to efficiency and practicality. However, as the international
regulatory system for marine resources is accorded new and broader
authority, especially in connection with the economics of fishing, this
practice should be kept at the focus of attention and continually re-
appraised to assure that the general interest of the community is safe-
guarded.
III. OBJECTIVES
By and large the major goal of the fishery commissions, as provided
in the basic treaties, is to determine the desirable rate of use of the
species concerned, usually defined in terms of the physical yield, and to
take measures to raise and maintain the stock at levels which permit
this rate of use to be maximized. However, the agreements for three
comnissions specify the very important additional objective of alloca-
ting shares of the fishery among the members. The fur seal treaty is
the leading illustration of an agreement that seeks both to provide for
taking the maximum sustainable yield (subject to some qualifications
noted below) and division of the harvest. The most notable aspect of
this arrangement is that it provides for a form of differential compen-
sation to the parties who make sacrifices by refraining from exploita-
tion. 7 In return for agreeing not to engage in pelagic sealing, a right
which they possess under the customary international law doctrine of
freedom of fishing on the high seas, the states concerned are assured a
certain portion of the kill made on land areas within the sovereignty of
other members.
The salmon agreement also has provision for dividing the catch
between the United States and Canada. The two parties agreed that
since the fishery was virtually destroyed, or at least overfished, and
had to be restored by "joint efforts and expense," they should share
equally in the catch.8 Should the effort and expense grow dispropor-
"It should be emphasized that the reference is to the parties and not to a general
category of participant in which any state might fall. As noted in discussing
membership, the Fur Seal Treaty does not provide for accession by new exploiters.
The principle upon which the agreement is based would, nonetheless, appear to
support the position that nonmembers should be reimbursed if they refrain from
exploitation.
Cs Salmon Convention, art. VII. The original agreement was amended by the
1957 Pink Salmon Protocol to omit the reference to the "fishing that is now largely
nonexistent" and to "joint efforts and expense." Article VII now reads:
The Commission shall regulate the fisheries for sockeye and for pink salmon
with a view to allowing, as nearly as practicable, an equal portion of such
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tionate, requiring a greater sacrifice by Canada, it may be expected
that demands for alteration in the division will be made. 99
Most controversial is the North Pacific agreement which provides
that Japan, and to a lesser degree Canada, will abstain from fishing
named species in certain places and under certain conditions. The
effect is to permit the United States and Canada to continue to take
the entire permissible catch of certain species which would otherwise
be open to exploitation by Japan. This arrangement is defended on
the ground that the United States and Canada (and the United States
only, in one instance) have already made sacrifices and will continue
to make them, to build and maintain the productivity of certain species,
which Japan did not traditionally exploit, and that it is desirable to
reward this sacrifice by continuing the pattern of exploitation and
nonexploitation, at least under certain conditions.' °
In terms of the conservation goal of the various fishery commissions,
i.e., determination of the rate of use of the species, most but not all
agreements embody the concept of the maximum sustainable yield.
However, in some instances, at least, it seems clear that the policy
problems faced by the commissions do not involve this goal at all and
in other instances there are rather unique problems that concern the
concept of maximum sustainable yield in a special way.
The Whaling Commission, for example, is faced not with the pros-
pect of securing maximum harvest but with preventing the complete
destruction of certain species and with attempting to restore stocks
from levels so grievously low that the industry is verging on collapse.
Despite the most expert scientific assistance, and the most explicit
predictions of disaster, the Commission has either been unable to
decide on the necessary restrictive measures or to secure compliance
with the measures it does adopt.' 01
sockeye salmon as may be caught each year and an equal portion of such pink
salmon as may be caught each year to be taken by the fishermen of each Party.
Royal, The International Fraser River Sockeye Salmon Fishery, in PAPERS
PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONSERVATION
OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA 243, 255, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1O/7 (1956).
'See generally van Cleve, The Economic and Scientific Basis of the Principle
of Abstention, 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 47, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/37 (1958).
°'The following paragraph from [1964-1965] WHALING COMM'N REP. 17 is a
remarkable commentary on the problems faced by the Whaling Commission:
During the later part of the meeting, Mr. S. J. Holt referred to the proposal
that the Commission had made to the Director-General of F.A.O. for the colla-
boration of the latter with the Commission in making future assessments of the
Antarctic Whale stocks. He said that the Director-General had indicated that
this collaboration could not be expected if the Commission permitted the results
of the scientific studies to be used merely for the organization of the more
efficient destruction of the resource for which it was responsible.
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The Fur Seal Commission, too, confronts a unique situation. The
initial agreement, concluded in 1911 among the United States, Russia,
Japan, and Great Britain, said merely that the parties desired to adopt
"effective means for the preservation and protection of fur seals
which frequent the waters of the North Pacific Ocean."' 0' The con-
vention prohibited pelagic sealing, leaving the yearly take to be har-
vested on the island rookeries by the individual state owning the island.
As noted above, compensation was, and is, payable to those parties
left unable to engage in exploitation. The policy initially pursued by
the United States in managing the Pribiloff Islands herd, the largest,
was not that of seeking the largest herd biologically possible but that
of securing the optimum economic yield. 03 The present agreement,
concluded in 1957 among the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and
Canada, adopts as the goal that of taking "effective measures toward
achieving the maximum sustainable productivity of the fur seal re-
sources of the North Pacific Ocean so that the fur seal population can
be brought to and maintained at levels which will provide the greatest
harvest year after year, with due regard to their relation to the
productivity of the other living marine resources of the area." In view
of the qualifying clause this is not an unequivocal affirmation of the
aim of maximum sustainable yield; its purpose was apparently to take
account of the possibility that fur seals prey on salmon, a resource
valued highly by all four parties to the agreement. Presumably the
implication is that the fur seal harvest might be increased in order to
reduce the loss of salmon to these predators. The policy problem thus
posed is that of determining the relationship of fur seals to other
valuable resources and deciding upon a management goal in accord
therewith. 04
The Halibut Commission, the first to be organized, was originally
intended to halt the depletion of the fishery and to raise the stocks to
'uPreamble to Fur Seal Convention in 26 HERTSLETS Com RCIAL TRATzs
348 (1913).21The following statement appears in J. TomAsEvIc, ITERNATIONAL AGMMENTS
oN CO SERVATION OF MAmNE REsOURCES at 99 (1943) :
Exploitation of the fur seal herd is a business based on a certain set of biological
data governing the development of the herd. The aim of conservation is not to
let the herd develop to biological optimum, but to develop an economically
optimum herd, i.e., a herd of a numerical strength and sex and age composition
that is capable of producing steadily an optimal yield. Such a herd would
probably be considerably smaller than the biologically optimal herd.
1" If this is the policy problem it would appear that the goal of "maximum sus-
tainable productivity" requires very considerable qualification and that, in fact,
management must make some determination of the worth of fur seals, vis-a-vis
salmon. Obviously biological principles alone do not provide much assistance for
this decision.
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higher levels.' In 1953 the objective was broadened, and the author-
ity of the Commission enhanced, to embrace the task of managing
the fishery for the purpose of achieving the maximum sustained yield.
As is well known the Commission has been highly successful in raising
the yield of a depleted fishery from very low levels to consistently
high ones. It is a mark of the complex, time-consuming nature of the
task of securing the maximum sustainable yield that it took nearly 40
years before the Commission could announce in its 1962 Annual Re-
port:...
The noteworthy event of the year was attainment of a total catch that
was close to the maximum sustainable yield. It was the culmination of
over three decades of scientific management and placed the Pacific Hali-
but fishery in a unique position among the marine fisheries of the world.
This achievement (and few, if any, now dispute that the Commission's
scientific record is outstanding' °7) was not reached without substantial
impact on the pattern of industry operation, including activities in
fisheries other than halibut. The primary method chosen by the Com-
mission over the years was that of reducing the catch by restricting
the length of the fishing season.' To effectuate this the Commission
established subareas of the entire convention area, specified catch
limits for such areas and halted fishing when the limits were at-
tained. 9 Other regulations imposed size limits and restrictions on
gear, particularly the prohibition of trawling for halibut. The Com-
mission in 1954 briefly remarked on the effect of this form of regula-
tion: "0
When regulation began 23 years ago the catch was only 44 million
pounds and a nine-month season of fishing was required to make the
catch. Under the Commission's management there has been such a pro-
gressive improvement of the stocks that the present 71 million pound
catch was taken in about two months of fishing.
Perhaps in anticipation of the question whether this drastic shortening
'N The Halibut Convention of 1923, T.S. No. 701, was the first in a series of
agreements. Revisions were agreed upon in 1930 and 1937 and the latter was re-
placed by the 1953 agreement.
'so IPHC, REGULATION AND INVESTIGATION OF THE PACIFIC HALIBUT FISHERY IN
1962 in 1962 IPHC ANN. REP. 7.
'' See BIOLOGICAL AND Ecoxoasic ASPECTS OF FISHERIES MfANAGEMENT 39, 76, 84(J. Crutchfield ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as CRUTCHFIELD]. Christy and Scott
characterize the halibut treaty (and the salmon and tuna treaties) as "the most
effective stock treaties." F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMONWEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES 206 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Christy & Scott]. See D. JOHNSTON,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 379-81 (1965).
108 1947 IFC ANN. REP. 10.
'°
8Id. at 11.
11 1954 IPHC ANN. REP. 9.
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of the fishing season might have detrimental economic impact on the
industry, the two paragraphs immediately following added to this
appraisal of the Commission's success as follows: 1
The accumulated gain in production over the 1931 pre-regulation level
now totals nearly 250 million pounds of halibut, worth about $35,000,000
to the fleets at the annual average prices that prevailed during the period.
In addition to this direct gain the reduced time required to take the
increased catch has left the fleets and crews free to engage in other fish-
eries or other productive activities. This saving of effort has been worth
at least an additional $25,000,000 to the fishermen.
The combined economic gain of about $60,000,000 has resulted from
appropriations usable by the Commission of $1,850,000 by both countries
combined during the entire 31 years of its existence. Canada and the
United States have indeed enjoyed an extremely high investment return.
These Commission statements offer illustration of a proposition that
has attracted critical commentary by economists who question the
amount, even existence, of gain." 2 Some earlier criticism has been
muted in later observations and the closest observer, among econo-
mists, of the halibut fishery does not dispute that, within the objec-
tive and the methods the Commission is authorized to pursue, there
have been benefits from the management program." 3 It is more gen-
erally accepted now that the improved levels of halibut stock since
1931 are due in major, if not sole, part to the management program
and that the increased physical yield thereby secured does represent a
material benefit. However, economists do emphasize, and this facet is
missing from the Commission's appraisal of "economic gain" of
$60,000,000, that the regulatory program has imposed costs which
have reduced the net gain below what could be realized if the govern-
ments concerned would broaden the mandate of the Commission." 4
'Id. at 9-10. The Director of Investigations later expanded on this account.
Bell, Economic Effects of Regulation of the Pacific Halibut Fishery in CGRUTCH-
FELD, supra note 107, at 51.
u Crutchfield, ,Common Property Resources and Factor Allocation, 22 CAr.
3. EcoN. & POL. Sc. 292 (1956); Gordon, Obstacles to Agreement on Control in the
Fishing Industry in THE EcoxomIcs OF FisHERsS 65 (MR Turvey & J. Wiseman
eds. 1957).
' Professor Crutchfield states:
It is perfectly obvious that the greater sustained yield of more marketable fish
realized under regulation is a direct boon to the consumer. The industry may
well owe its very existence to the remarkably effective cooperation of the
Commission, the fishermen and vessel owners, and the Governments of Canada
and the United States. The real question is whether we can realize greater
benefits.
Crutchfield, Some Economic Aspects of the Halibut Program in CRUTCHFIELD,
supra note 107, at 79.
"Id. at 76-79. Bell, supra note 111, seeks to make a point-by-point refutation of
these or comparable allegations.
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The Commission is not unaware of this situation but has been unable
to act because of the limitations on its authority under the treaty."15
Hence it is reasonable to believe that criticism of the effect of regula-
tions, to the extent they are undesirable on economic grounds, is not
directed at the Commission or at its staff but rather at those respon-
sible for setting the Commission's terms of reference.
The difficulty of defining the objectives of fishery management in
general terms, and of conveying thereby an adequate notion of the
responsibilities of the established administrative agency, is amply dem-
onstrated by the salmon agreement and the programs undertaken pur-
suant to it. The initial 1937 agreement, amended in 1957 to include pink
salmon, calls for the Commission to seek the "protection, preservation,
and extension" of the sockeye and pink salmon resources of the Fraser
River System. In practice this has been interpreted to mean that the
Commission is to manage the fisheries so as to seek the maximum sus-
tainable yield with an adequate escapement for spawning purposes.'1 6
These very broad directives have required, and enabled, the Com-
mission and staff to engage in a variety of activities, including not only
the biological investigation of the fishery but also study of the imme-
diate water environment and the impact upon it of the surrounding
land-based activities. In the beginning the Commission confronted the
major problem of determining the major causes of the decline in the
fishery. Fishery practices and obstructions in the river system, artifi-
cial as well as natural, were assumed to be the main contributing fac-
tors but it was recognized that investigation was "a first duty" of the
Commission.1 7 By 1941 the Commission had identified an obstruc-
tion in the Fraser River at Hell's Gate as of major importance. In
these early years the Commission's program placed great emphasis on
devising a permanent solution to the problem of depletion of the
fishery."' In more recent times the complexity of the relationship be-
tween the river system and the adjoining land areas has been increased
by the multitude of changes in land use which affect the spawning
streams that are, in turn, indispensable to "protection and preserva-
tion" of the fishery. The increasing urbanization and industrialization
"'Dunlop, Management Practices in the Pacific Halibut Fishery and Their
Relation to the Biology of Conservation, in CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 107, at 41.
See also James, Political and Sociological Linitations of Fishery Management,
id. at 23-30.
"'1965 IPSFC ANN. REP. 3-6 discusses the complexities of this undertaking.
"7 [1937-1938] IPSFC ANN. REP. 6.
.. The annual reports for years 1941 through 1944 provide ample evidence of the
importance of these obstructions in the Commission's work.
[ VOL. 43 : 115
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
of the area impose new problems on the Commission and in time will
likely require some difficult choices on the part of the governments con-
cerned.
Throughout its history the Salmon Commission has also had to con-
tend with the involved task of acquiring knowledge about the various
species of salmon which together constitute the Fraser River salmon
runs. In addition it has been necessary to devise means by which
selected fishery pressure can be exerted on the various runs as escape-
ment requirements indicate. And, at the same time, the Commission
has had to maintain a regulatory scheme which divides the catch
equally between the two national groups of fishermen.
Among the final three Commissions whose common goal is that of
making possible the maximum sustainable yield, IATTC, ICNAF,
and INPFC, there are also notable differences in the contexts of their
operations. The Tuna Commission (IATTC), first of these to become
active, and ICNAF were both formed in anticipation of the problems
of excessive fishing, but because the former is limited to certain species
while the latter is aimed at all the species of a defined area, they have
widely different scope. The Tuna Commission had concluded by
1956-1957 that the yield from none of the species had passed the max-
imum sustainable119 but by 1961-1962 analysis showed that the yield
from one of the major species, yellowfin tuna, had come to surpass
the maximum sustainable and that catch limitations were now required
to restore the stock to an optimum level."0 In 1966 member govern-
ments accepted the Commission's recommended regulations and put
them into effect; in addition two nonmembers, Japan and Canada,
agreed to abide by the recommendations. 121
ICNAF faces perhaps the most complicated problems of all the
Commissions sharing the same goal because, first, it includes a rela-
tively large number of members, and second, it is concerned with a
considerable variety of fish in the convention area, which enormously
aggravates the difficulty of determining a maximum sustainable yield.
This Commission is also distinguished by the explicitness of its recog-
nition that economic considerations must be taken into account in its
regulatory efforts. At its 1965 meeting ICNAF discussed the general
subject of "Review of Possible Conservation Actions for the Com-
mission Area" on the basis of a document so entitled and prepared by
See 1956 IATTC ANw. RE:P. 3.
1961 IATTC ANx. REP. 3-4.
PAcIFic FisHE~mAx, Oct. 1966, at 10.
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W. Templeman, Chairman of the Research and Statistics Committee
and J. Gulland of the Assessments subcommittee. -12 2 The memorandum
places heavy emphasis upon the economic implications of alternative
actions in different contexts and upon the many real problems in at-
taining the goal of maximum sustainable yield. The summary of dis-
cussion in the Commissioner's meeting reflects general awareness of
the economic implications of regulation, although it appears that the
Commission thought it premature to examine those difficulties within
the Commission until the subject had been examined within the various
member states. 12' It did, however, agree on the desirability of sending
an ICNAF representative to an FAO meeting of experts to study
economic aspects of fishing yield.12
The attitude within ICNAF may well be affected by the fact that
several members are also members of NEAFC where economic aspects
had previously been discussed."2 NEAFC is relatively unique in that
the goal of the group is described in the basic agreement merely as that
of ensuring conservation and rational exploitation of the fisheries of
the convention area. No commitment is recorded regarding the par-
ticular yield to be sought. It seems likely that this stems from the
belief that it is both desirable and possible to establish wider goals for
the regulatory process.
The North Pacific Commission's objective of ensuring maximum
sustained productivity has until relatively recently been subordinate
to the accompanying goal of allocating the yield of certain species
through the principle of abstention. For the first five years of the
agreement no determination could be made on the question of whether
or not these species continued to qualify for abstention.126 For present
purposes the most important criterion for this decision is that "evi-
dence based upon scientific research indicates that more intensive
exploitation of the stock will not provide a substantial increase in
yield which can be sustained year after year."'1 2 7 This is not an
unequivocal statement requiring proof that a stock is not yielding the
"- ICNAF Doc. Serial No. 1450 (1965).
" ICNAF, REPORT OF THIRD MEETING OF COMMuISSIONERS, ICNAF Doc. Serial
No. 1572 (June 10, 1965).
" The Standing Committee on Research and Statistics, meeting prior to the
annual meeting, recommended that the Committee "be enabled to seek active partici-
pation by economists in the same way as statisticians, biologists, and oceano-
graphers at present take part." ICNAF REDBOOK pt. I, at 34 (1965).
' Id. Comment by Mr. Aglen of the United Kingdom.
INPFC Convention, art. 111(1) (a).
"
7 Id. art. IV(1) (b) (i).
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maximum sustainable catch, but apparently there is need to show that
the catch is nearly that level.
On four occasions the Commission has acted to remove stocks from
abstention. In 1959, 1961, and 1962 the Commission decided that the
herring stocks off Alaska, the continental United States and west of the
Queen Charlotte Islands no longer qualified for abstention. Also in
1962 the Commission removed the halibut of the East Bering Sea from
the requirement of abstention. When these stocks were opened to
joint exploitation by all parties it became necessary to consider con-
servation regulations framed for the purpose of managing the fisheries
in order to obtain the maximum sustained yield. In the future, if this
Commission continues to have one, 2 ' its work is more and more likely
to be in the area of regulating joint fishery exploitation by all parties.
In commentary on the above description of objectives of the com-
missions, it may be noted that only the NEAFC Convention appears
to anticipate the importance of economic considerations. It is not
intended here to attempt to add to the debate between biologists,
economists, and administrators about the importance of maximum
net economic yield in contrast to maximum physical yield, except to
observe that the two sides to the debate obviously share more points of
agreement than disagreement. Moreover, despite divergent reports it
seems highly probable that commissions do have a keen appreciation of
economic influence and that, indeed, it is in a sense impossible to
operate without regard to these considerations.20 For example, study
of fishing effort probably cannot be successful unless economic and
social factors are taken into account. And beyond this the extent to
which industry groups are represented in formal advisory committees
or as advisers, and therefore a part of a national delegation, presents
every opportunity for pressing the relevance of at least some economic
considerations. 30
Again no novelty attends the observation that no matter how ad-
vanced economic studies of fishery operations become and no matter
how explicitly economic factors are recognized, the overriding problem
is that of persuading national decision-makers and, in the end, the
'It is well-known that the Commission now exists on a year-to-year basis
since under INPFC Convention, art. XI, any contracting party may give notice of
termination to the other parties "whereupon it shall terminate as to all Contracting
Parties." There is a good deal of speculation about the effects of this possibility of
termination upon the Commission's decision to recommend removal of the East
Bering Sea from abstention by the Japanese. See generally Hearings, supra note 72.
See James, mipra note 115, in CRUTCHFELD.
CRTJTCrFIELD 76, 79.
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industry itself of the desirability of certain actions. The point to be
emphasized is that the commissions and the industry must be viewed
in the context of the whole social process of which they are a part, the
social process which affects them, and which they in turn affect.
Specialists in various segments of this process thus may make a con-
tribution to the more effective operation of international (and national)
decision-making mechanisms. In particular, sociologists and social
psychologists could play a key role in influencing events. This is by
no means an affirmation that the commissions and those benefitted by
their work cannot successfully operate without the additional input,
but there can be no serious doubt that the degree of success might be
materially heightened by a far more sustained and elaborate investi-
gation of all factors influencing the decision-making process.
IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE COMMISSIONS
Within the competence conferred by treaty upon the various com-
missions, various decision-making functions are required to be per-
formed by the commission and component organs, persons and groups.
We are here concerned with the internal operation of the commission
and seek to describe who exercises what authority function vis-h-vis
another organ or official of the group. In a more complete study a
similar analysis would be expanded to include commission relations
with member states and other participants. The various subheadings
to follow are intended to indicate authority, or decision-making func-
tions and the precise references for each of these terms may be seen
in the discussions subsumed under each. For convenience in this
examination we refer briefly to the scope of the various competences
exercised by the commissions in discharge of their duties, although in
a formal sense this is an aspect of the external relationships of the
commissions. The examination is limited to three decision-making
functions-intelligence, recommendation and prescription-because
these appear to be most important for the internal decision-making
process. But complete inquiry would embrace also the invocation,
application, appraisal, and termination functions.13 '
A. Intelligence
The intelligence function is that of securing information to serve as
a basis for decisions and recommendations or, in more general state-
' For more intensive examination of these decision functions see McDougal,
Lasswell, & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision
[ VOL. 43 :115
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ment, for the execution of all other decision-making functions. There
are very great differences among the commissions both in the scope of
the treaty provisions authorizing this particular activity and in the
allocation of responsibilities for discharge of the function. These dif-
ferences exist despite the fact that in the end all commissions share
the task of making decisions to prescribe, or more usually, to recom-
mend measures which are to be based upon information about par-
ticular resources and their environment.
The Northeast Atlantic, halibut, and salmon agreements all contain
relatively brief, general statements concerning intelligence activities.
Indeed that in the first-named agreement is almost enigmatic, stating
merely that the Commission is "to keep under review the fisheries in
the Convention area." More than likely this brevity is due to the ar-
rangement envisaged in article 11 under which the Commission "shall
when possible seek the advice of the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea and the cooperation of the Council in carrying
out any necessary investigation and, for this purpose, may make such
joint arrangements as may be agreed" with the Council. 32
The two oldest agreements, the halibut and salmon, are almost
equally brief. 3  The former merely states that the Commission "shall
make such investigations as are necessary into the life history of the
halibut in the Convention waters."' 34 The salmon treaty is a bit more
elaborate, enjoining the Commission to "make a thorough investiga-
tion into the natural history of the Fraser River sockeye salmon, into
hatchery methods, spawning ground conditions, and other related mat-
ters" and to make investigation of the obstructions to the ascent of
the salmon in the river system.tm
(Mimeo. 1966). See also H. LASSWELL, TE DEcIsioN PROCESS: SEVEN CATEGORIES
OF FUNCTIoNAL ANALYsIs (Bur. of Gov'tal Research, Univ. of Maryland, 1956).
=It is of interest to note that the Northeast Atlantic Convention differs from
the others with respect to the basic purpose of scientific investigation. Whereas the
Tuna and ICNAF treaties both enjoin the Commission to make recommendations
"on the basis of scientific investigations," the Northeast Atlantic Convention only
requires this "so far as practicable." This appears to support the observation that
this Commission's objectives are more broadly conceived than those which are
formulated in terms of the physical yield of the fishery concerned.
'The Fur Seal Commission was not established until 1957 although the basic
agreement was concluded in 1911.
SHIalibut Convention, art. 3. This provision does not differ in any material
way from that in the original convention, concluded in 1923.
' Salmon Convention, art. IIL This provision was in the original agreement
concluded in 1930 and was not changed by the 1957 Protocol. However, Article VI of
the Protocol divides certain research responsibilities regarding pink salmon as
follows:
1. The Parties shall conduct a coordinated investigation of pink salmon stocks
which enter the waters described in Article I of the Convention for thepurpose of determining the migratory movements of such stocks. That part
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INPFC contains several provisions concerning intelligence activities
in relation to the stocks of fish in the area. The major tasks of the
Commission in this respect are to "study" certain stocks of fish to
determine whether they meet certain conditions requiring one or two
of the parties to abstain from exploitation, 36 to study certain stocks
to determine whether there is a need for joint conservation measures,'13 7
to "investigate the waters of the Convention area to determine if there
are areas in which salmon originating in the rivers of Canada and of
the United States of America intermingle with salmon originating in
the rivers of Asia," ' and to conduct further studies with the purpose
of recommending new areas in which the exploitation of salmon should
be abstained. In addition the Commission is to "compile and study"
records which it might obtain from the parties and to submit reports
of its activities to the parties.313
The Tuna and Northwest Atlantic agreements, concluded at about
the same time, contain basically the same provisions on types of in-
telligence activities, except that the scope of the former treaty's interest
is restricted to a few species. Article VI of the ICNAF treaty pro-
vides:
The Commission shall be responsible in the field of scientific investiga-
tion for obtaining and collecting the information necessary for maintain-
ing those stocks of fish which support international fisheries in the Con-
vention area....
Article VI also details the operations which the Commission itself may
undertake in fulfilling this responsibility or which may be undertaken
by other organizations on the Commission's behalf. The Commission
can make investigations "into the abundance, life history and ecology
of any species of acquatic life in any part of the Northwest Atlantic
Ocean;" collect and study information about the current conditions
and trends of Northwest Atlantic fishery resources; hold or arrange
hearings for the purpose of gathering factual information; conduct
fishing operations for purposes of scientific investigaion; and publish
reports of findings. The provisions of the tuna agreement parallel
these in every important respect. 140
of the investigation to be carried out in the waters described in Article I of
the Convention shall be carried out by the Commission.
INPFC Convention, art. III(1) (a), (b).
'Id. art. I1I(1) (c) (i).
' Id., Protocol.
"Id. art. III(l)(e).
14' IATTC Convention, art. II.
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The Whaling Convention provides that the Commission is to: 141
(a) encourage, recommend, or, if necessary, organize studies and investi-
gations relating to whales and whaling; (b) collect and analyze statis-
tical information concerning the current conditions and trend of the
whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities thereon; (c) study,
appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods of maintain-
ing and increasing the population of whale stocks.
The formulation is sufficiently broad to subsume any inquiry pertinent
to the Commission's objectives.
The same may be said for the Fur Seal Convention provision on the
intelligence function. Article II thereof sets out the detailed research
program the parties agree to coordinate among themselves and adds the
very general category of "other subjects involved in achieving the ob-
jectives of the Convention, as determined by the Commission. .. " In a
sense this is the broadest mandate possible for it would authorize re-
search into social and economic problems where pertinent to the Com-
mission's objectives. It is not difficult to interpret the objectives of the
parties in this sense. 42
Turning to the identification of those who engage in the intelligence
function, the most important distinction is the use of a professional
staff by three Commissions, the halibut, salmon, and tuna. 4 Only
these three groups have a permanent international organ specialized to
the task of providing the information upon which decisions or recom-
mendations can be founded. The effect of this method of serving the
intelligence function appears to be highly beneficial since these three
organizations are widely regarded as the most successful of the various
commissions. Although each of the three Commissions employs a full-
time staff, only the Tuna Convention so provides in the basic treaty.
Article 1(13) spells out the duties of the Executive Director in explicit
detail, including the important task of "drafting of programs of inves-
tigation." The pivotal nature of this responsibility is emphasized
further by the later provision that Commission recommendations for
joint action by the contracting parties are to be made "on the basis of
scientific investigations."' 44 The beneficial effects of this arrangement,
as executed by highly capable directors and staff, are evidenced by
"i Whaling Convention, art. IV.
" See text accompanying note 104 supra.
"'For other discussions of this topic, see R. VAx CLEvF & P. JOHNSON,
MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF THE NORTHEASTERN PACnIc 43-46
(Univ. of Wash. Pub. in Fisheries, New Series, Vol. II, No. 2, 1963) [hereinafter
cited as VAN CLEvE & JOHNSON] ; CHRISTY & ScoTt, mtpra note 107, at 205-07.
" IATTC Convention, art. 11(5).
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the success in obtaining member acceptance of Commission recommen-
dations. As noted above, the first task for the director and staff was
to investigate the fisheries to determine what the situation was in rela-
tion to the need for conservation regulations. Several years of investi-
gation by the staff led to the determination in 1956 that none of the
fisheries required conservation regulations because none were being
overfished. Members accepted this conclusion of the staff, a not in-
considerable achievement considering the political climate of that time
in terms of the oft-expressed fears about grave and damaging over-
fishing in the eastern Pacific.' 45 It is doubtful that this clarification
regarding the situation in the important tuna fisheries could have been
obtained without the work of an independent, international staff. In
addition, later in 1962, the staff concluded from research results that
yellowfin tuna were being overfished, and on this basis the Commis-
sion promptly recommended that the members take joint action to
institute specified conservation measures. By 1966 all members agreed
to implement conservation regulations. Again, in accounting for this
achievement, considerable weight must be given to the work of an
independent staff organization.
In sum, it is apparent that entrusting research responsibilities to a
relatively independent, internationally composed body adds consider-
able strength to a fishery commission.'4 6 Scholarly observers identify
these elements of strength in terms of the high quality and objectivity
of research results, the development in the staff of a sense of identity
with the commission rather than with one of the members, the en-
hancement of the commission's power vis4-vis members, greater ac-
ceptability for commission recommendations, and strong centralized
leadership. 4 7 In light of this very favorable experience with staff re-
search, the recent decision to decentralize research work in the newly
created Atlantic Tuna Commission appears strange indeed. 4
"' It may be recalled that during the period 1950-1958, i.e., the years before the
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, there was very considerable agitation in
the Central and South American states concerning the need for conserving fishing
resources in adjacent seas.
"'If the Commission is in fact stronger for having a professional staff, how-
ever, it is probably more significant to consider the factors which led to the estab-
lishment of an independent staff in the first place. Admittedly the staff is an im-
portant ingredient of strength but the more basic underlying factors also deserve
closer inquiry.
.. VAN CLEVE & JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 45-46.
.But see CHRISTY & ScOTT, supra note 107, at 207, where they state:
It is not clear which approach is better-dependence of the commission upon
national research efforts or the creation of the commission's own research
staff and facilities.
The case against the independent staff is summarized as follows:
[ VOL. 43: 115
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The Northeast Atlantic Commission also seeks to secure information
for its purposes from an international body, not from a constituent part
of the Commission in this case, but from a separate international
group, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (I.C.
E.S.). This continues the arrangement inaugurated in 1946 by the
Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the
Size Limits of Fish under which the Permanent Commission estab-
lished by the Convention was to "consult" with the I.C.E.S. "where
practicable.""4 Although the I.C.E.S. is an international body, its use
is not necessarily equivalent to the employment of an independent
staff. The I.C.E.S. itself does not engage in research, except with
respect to hydrography, but exists to encourage, promote, and coor-
dinate the research activities of its members.15 In the end, therefore,
investigative activities are still largely within national control. None-
theless, the divorce of the intelligence function from the commission
responsible for making recommendations could act as a barrier to
excessive political intrusion into the research process.
On the western side of the Atlantic, in the Northwest Atlantic
Commission, the conduct of scientific investigation is also decentralized
and is pursued by scientists from individual member nations. Despite
the extensive enumeration of intelligence activities in the convention,
direct Commission participation was not apparently intended to be
extensive. The Conference which established ICNAF adopted a re-
commendation declaring:151
In the field of scientific investigations the Commission should be pri-
marily responsible for: (a) arrangement for and coordination of work
by agencies, and (b) establishment of working relationship with inter-
national agencies. It is important, for the purposes of the Convention,
that enlarged and coordinated scientific investigations should be carried
The alternative point of view states that a commission research staff will act as an
independent bureaucracy, tending to develop a vested interest in its own point of
view, becoming overly defensive of its own past decisions, and using its claim to
impartiality as a shield against criticism. It is claimed that free argument and
contention among scientists from different nations leads to constructive criticism
and perhaps to better results in the long run.
Unfortunately, the authors leave the reader to speculate both about the evidence sug-
gesting this view and about the source of the "alternative point of view." Purely as
speculation it may be thought that the authors are stating a point of view they
themselves have developed and that, continuing to speculate, the activities and at-
titudes of the staff of the Halibut Commission may have suggested the ingredients
of this "alternative point of view."
" Article 12(5). Text in 2 A. PEASLEE, INTERNATIO NAL GOVERNMENTAL OR- -
GANIZATIONS 1692 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
'The latest agreement on I.C.E.S. on hand is the original of 1902 as revised in
1950. Id. at 1118. I have been unable to locate the 1964 I.C.E.S. agreement
1951 ICNAF ANN. RlP. 24.
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out and such investigations insofar as possible should be conducted by
agencies of the Contracting Governments or by public or private agencies
(e.g., universities or private marine research laboratories). If investiga-
tions necessary to the purposes of the Convention cannot be arranged
through existing Government, public, or private agencies, they should be
undertaken by the Commission, but only in accordance with approved
budgets. It is not contemplated that any such investigations conducted
by Commission personnel or equipment would include field operations.
Perhaps it is clear from this passage that a major determinative factor
in the selection of the role of the Commission in intelligence gathering
was financial, leading to a desire to avoid creation of an international
scientific staff. The admonition that Commission investigations, if
necessary, should be "only in accordance with approved budgets" ap-
pears wholly gratuitous except as an indication that the Commission
was not to undertake large operational expenditures.
Other intelligence functions are performed by the Northwest Atlan-
tic Commissioners, acting, apparently, as representatives of their re-
spective governments (as distinguished from acting as a body), as well
as by panels, committees, and the secretariat. In terms of the Com-
mission's ultimate objectives the intelligence functions allocated to the
panels seem most significant. Each panel is responsible, within its
subarea, for "keeping under review" the fisheries and the scientific
and other information related thereto. As noted above, this function
is discharged in part by the use of groups of "scientific advisers" who
are attached to each panel and who meet formally to adopt recom-
mendations for submission to the panels. Indeed, the scientific advisers
perform the major intelligence role in panel operations. The panels
were apparently intended to be available for even wider service, as
implied by the provision that "Each Panel shall investigate and report
to the Commission upon any matter referred to it by the Commis-
sion.' 5 2 The channels for conveying information are established in
the rules of procedure for the panels. There it is specified that a sum-
mary report of all proceedings of all panel meetings is to be prepared
and submitted to the panel chairman, who must in turn furnish a sum-
mary report of all panel meetings to the Commission.
The Executive Secretary of ICNAF, as the principal full-time staff
member of the Commission, is pivotal in the discharge of intelligence
functions. Although no specific activities other than direction of the
staff are specified in the convention, the general directive that the
'52 ICNAF Convention, art. VII(5).
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Executive Secretary "shall perform such other functions as the Com-
mission shall prescribe,"'1 3 furnishes ample basis for the numerous
specific intelligence operations performed by the Executive Secretary
and the staff. These include extensive work in the collection, collation,
and dissemination of statistics regarding convention area fisheries, the
preparation of the numerous publications issued by the Commission,
the maintenance of informational exchanges with other international
groups concerned with fisheries, especially FAO and ICES, the com-
pilation of the individual research reports submitted by the various
governments, and direct personal communication with national fishery
officials and groups. A rough indication of the scope of the Secretariat's
role in the intelligence process may be seen in the growth of the
budget item for "contractual services including printing" from $2000
for 1952-1953 to $22,100 for 1964-1965.Y1"
Other more specific duties of the Secretariat in the intelligence pro-
cess involve the maintenance of records of all commission meetings
and their circulation to members and commissioners, as well as certain
assignments in the receipt of information, such as those regarding ad-
visory committee members authorized to attend commission sessions
and the credentials of commissioners.
A final important intelligence task of the Executive Secretary is
providing information about financial requirements of the Commission.
It is his duty to prepare and submit budget estimates to the Com-
mission and he is authorized to supplement information and explana-
tion requested by the Commission with such additional material as he
believes "necessary and useful."' 5 5 Information regarding financial
contributions is also to be supplied to the Commission by the Executive
Secretary.
The individual commissioners of ICNAF also have certain intelli-
gence activities assigned to them including, most importantly perhaps,
that of arranging "where feasible, for all reports on subjects of interest
to the Commission which are published in their own countries to be
sent to the Executive Secretary for record purposes."' 5 6 In addition
the commissioners are to inform the Executive Secretary of those ad-
visory committee members authorized to attend nonexecutive sessions
of the Commission and the panels. 5 7
Id. art. III (3).
[1951-1952] ICNAF ANN. REP. 19; [1962-1963] ICNAF ANN. REP. 15.
ICNAF HANDBOOK, Financial Regulation 3.3, at 51 (1965).
'Id. Rule of Procedure 23(b), at 46.
Id. Rule of Procedure 2, at 39.
1967]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
One of the committees established by ICNAF appears to serve,
primarily, an intelligence function. The convention itself makes no
mention of committees, but the Rules of Procedure emphasize that this
particular function is the prime duty of the Committee on Research
and Statistics. Rule 16 (c) declares, in relevant part: 1 5
The Committee shall develop and recommend to the Commission such
policies and procedures in the collection, compilation, analysis, and dis-
semination of fishery statistics as may be necessary to insure that the
Commission has available at all times complete, current, and equivalent
statistics on fishery activities in Convention waters.
Although the annual reports are very likely not the best source of
evidence on the operations of the committee in carrying out its man-
date, it is nonetheless clear from even the brief summaries of committee
activities contained in these reports that rigorous and sustained efforts
have been devoted to improvements in research and in the whole pro-
cess of identifying, gathering, analyzing and disseminating statistical
information. 159 It would be fruitless to attempt to summarize the de-
tailed work of this committee or the special committees formed from
time to time to deal with this particular subject.
Decentralization of research responsibilities is especially conspicu-
ous in the North Pacific Fisheries Commission, whose annual reports
indicate that the parties consider this as far more than a matter of
form. Expert observers regard its decentralized research as a sub-
stantial obstacle to more successful operation of the Commission and
express the view that provision for an independent scientific staff is
needed, among other steps if the situation is to be corrected.'
It is true that the Commission establishes its own research program,
at least in broad outline, but for actual research it relies upon agencies
of the three member governments.' 61 Efforts are made, through the
Standing Committee on Biology and Research, to coordinate the ten-
tative research plans of each national section and the Executive Secre-
tary also serves a coordinating function as plans mature and are re-
vised and modified. However, the parties appear to wish to make com-
" Id. Rule of Procedure 16(c), at 44.
''The dimensions of this work are better seen in the Committee Reports which
are sufficiently extensive to be published separately. See, e.g., ICNAF REDBOOK
pt. I (1965) which consists of the Committee Report.
" VAN CLEVE & JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 49.
"' This policy and procedure were adopted at the first annual meeting. 1954
INPFC ANN. REP. 1-2.
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pletely clear that each national agency retains full and final control
over the scope of its research efforts." 2
The major intelligence work of INPFC is undertaken in various
committees, but the sources of the information upon which the com-
mittees base their work and their recommendations appear to vary
somewhat, depending on the stock of fish involved and the specific
decision to be made. The two major committees involved are the
Committee on Biology and Research (hereinafter cited as CBR), and
the Ad Hoc Committee on Abstention. The CBR is primarily re-
sponsible "for the planning, assignment, coordination and analysis of
the results of research on salmon on the high seas,"16 but it also has
duties in connection with effects of the Bering Sea groundfishery upon
halibut, with king crab, and with oceanography relating to salmon
distribution. In the past, the CBR has devoted major attention to the
salmon question, primarily in connection with the Commission's duty
under the Protocol, to study the convention waters to determine the
area of intermingling of American and Asian salmon. Although the
chances seem virtually nonexistent for implementing the Protocol fully,
the CBR continues to devote a predominant share of its labors to this
subject, utilizing the services of large numbers of scientists during the
meetings which precede and accompany the annual meeting of the
Commission."' The information relevant to the distribution and ori-
gin of salmon comes to the committee from the individual national
members, and the committee, or its subcommittee(s) on salmon, are
supposed to advise the Commission as to its meaning and effect.'65
It is instructive to note that the subcommittees working on this subject
are directed to reach agreement on how the data should be inter-
preted, but are also expected to report differing views if agreement
cannot be reached.'66 It is probably this procedure of wholly decen-
tralized initial research, coupled with the need for agreed interpreta-
'1956 INPFC ANN. REP. 4 notes that in seeking Commission objectives
the studies are being conducted by research organizations of the three par-
ticipating countries, the Commission being charged by the Convention to
utilize the technical and scientific services of official agencies of the Contracting
Parties and their political sub-divisions, insofar as feasible.
A later report states that "research plans for investigation of salmon on the high
seas in 1964 are tentative in nature and subject to modification by the various
participating agencies, as funds, equipment and staff require." 1963 id. at 9.
"' 1964 id. at 4.
...At the 1965 meeting it is estimated that at least half of the CBR Report
and appendices thereto were devoted to this specific subject or to background matters
relating thereto. 1965 INPFC PRoc. 79-203, Doc. No. 840, with apps.
" 1963 INPFC ANN. RP. 6.
'c "Id.
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tions of it, which accounts for the comment by knowledgeable ob-
servers that research results have come to be viewed merely as bases
for negotiation." 7 The inference to be drawn from this appears to be
that research findings are on occasion regarded as political gambits,
subject to treatment as such, rather than as objective scientific deter-
minations providing a basis for concerted action. How often these
episodes occur is not evident in the annual reports; hence little can
be said of the extent of harm this practice does to the decision-making
process involved. But it would appear fairly certain that some dam-
age is caused, for surely the process of negotiating scientific results
threatens to strip the "agreed" results of any claim to objectivity and,
thereby, to reduce prospects of longrun acceptance., Some hint of
the consequences of this practice may perhaps be seen in the terms of
reference laid down for the Salmon Subcommittee of the CBR. After
noting that the subcommittee was to report the differing views of the
members if agreed interpretation could not be reached after a reason-
able attempt, the subcommittee was informed that "the jointly-agreed
scientific reports on each salmon species which were prepared at the
1960 and 1961 annual meetings were not to be reopened for amend-
ment."'0 9 This may be no more than a notation that further research
results are not needed with respect to certain questions, but it also
bears the interpretation that it is better to leave certain findings at
rest, even if new information appears to challenge them and to indicate
a need for new "agreed reports."
This concern for agreement on scientific matters may be reflected
also in the care taken to establish other procedures for the reporting of
research results. The CBR has created a group of "Editorial Refer-
ees," "one of whose functions is to review scientific materials sub-
mitted from national sources for publication in the Commission's bulle-
tin series. "' ° The nature and scope of this review are not further
clarified in the annual reports, except that the referees may approve or
disapprove of the contents.' Whatever it consists of, this review is a
", See VAN CLEVE & JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 44.
" This text statement is not an assertion that scientific results are formulated
with such precision that they leave no room for argument. Nor do I contend that
value judgments do not play a role in determining what is accepted as scientific
"truth." However, admitting these qualifications, the more or less conscious intru-
sion of political considerations is an entirely different matter and it is such intru-
sion that is referred to in this instance.
" 1965 INPFC ANN. PROC. 81.
" 1960 INPFC ANN. REP. 9.
17 This is an interpretation of the following sentences:
The Commission publishes research bulletins, which contain scientific papers
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prerequisite to the Commission's approval which must be secured for
all publications.
At least two subsidiary groups within the North Pacific structure do
make use of an international source of intelligence. The Subcommittee
on Bering Sea Groundfish and the Committee on Gulf of Alaska
Groundfish have made relatively intensive use of staff members from
the International Pacific Halibut Commission in connection with prob-
lems within their purviewY In connection with recommendations
regarding halibut conservation measures in the East Bering Sea, the
facilities and staff of the Halibut Commission seem to be especially
useful. For the 1963 season, information regarding American and
Canadian fishing in this area was relayed by the Halibut Commission
to the North Pacific Commission headquarters." 3 In implementing
conservation measures in this area the North Pacific Commission
adopted a subcommittee report containing recommendations that the
staff maintain "continuous liaison" with the Halibut staff and that
"the Canadian and United States Sections of the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission recommend to their governments that
they request their commissioners on the International Pacific Halibut
Commission to have their staff work closely with the staff of the Inter-
national North Pacific Fisheries Commission in assembling and inter-
preting the catch and effort data and determining the closing date."' 4
This latter statement indicates the formal methods for coordinating
the intelligence activities of the two organizations, whereby the coop-
eration of one commission staff is not requested directly by another
but rather by the more roundabout fashion of soliciting the intercession
of the member governments. However, there is no doubt that informal
communications between staffs occur without regard to this procedure.
In addition several members of the Halibut staff have been listed as
"consultants" to the Commission in the meetings since 1963.
The final major area of intelligence activities concerns the Ad Hoc
Committee on Abstention (hereinafter cited as AHA) which bears the
responsibility for deleting species from the abstention list or adding
species to it. For this purpose the Commission is supposed to study
submitted from national sources and those prepared by the joint efforts of
scientists from the member countries. All papers pertain to the Commission's
research programs. Before submission to the Commission for approval for
publication, each paper must receive the approval of three editorial referees.
1961 INPFC ANix. REp. 10.
"' 1965 INPFC ANr. PRoc. 139, 205.
1963 INPFC ANN. REP. 15.
a" Id. at 19.
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the stocks concerned to determine whether they meet the requirements
specified in article IV. The methods chosen for this task testify to the
difficulties stemming from the decentralized method of obtaining in-
formation. In 1955 the Commission established procedures by which
it would "study" the stocks .1 5 These consisted of requesting the
parties managing an abstained stock to submit a report on the man-
agement, paying particular attention to abstention requirements. A
committee was established, which later acquired the title of Ad Hoc
Committee on Abstention, to consider these reports and make recom-
mendations to the Commission. The results of this arrangement are
mixed-on four occasions the Commission has decided to delete cer-
tain stocks in certain areas from abstention. However, there has al-
ways been major controversy about compliance by the United States
and Canada with this procedure and with the provisions of article IV.
From time to time Japan has complained that no information at all
has been submitted on fisheries for which requests have been made for
data; that a large mass of data is furnished but in a form that makes
it difficult to review or to relate to particular convention provisions;
and that the data does not establish that the convention requirements
on abstention are satisfied. Of these difficulties only the first two relate
to the manner in which information is secured; the last could be raised
no matter who provides the basic data. However, it seems to be very
clear that all three objections are related. After all, it is the United
States and Canada who determine the scope and detail of their re-
ports and who also have a decisive voice in determining whether the
data contained therein supports continued abstention. In the absence
of an international staff there is no method of checking the information
submitted since, by definition, Japan is excluded from the fishery.
Understandably, then, dispute is likely to center upon definitions of
concepts and compliance with standards, except on those occasions
when little or no data is forthcoming. The flavor of the Japanese dis-
content may be seen in the following statement of its spokesman on
the AHA: 116
Commissioner Iwao Fujita stated in reply that Japan could not agree
with the views expressed by the Canadian and United States members.
Japan was not asking for perfection nor for irrefutable evidence, but the
abstention principle made this Convention an unprecedented one and
complicated Japan's fishery relations with a number of countries. To
'75 1955 INPFC ANN. REP. 4.
"= 1965 INPFC ANN. PROc. 245.
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justify this relinquishment of the freedom of high seas fishing to the
people of Japan was a heavy responsibility, and the evidence must natu-
rally be strong and rigorously interpreted. It was the responsibility of
the Japanese National Section to insist upon this kind of evidence. The
Committee had met annually since five years after the Convention en-
tered into force, and the Japanese National Section was still waiting to
learn under what conditions certain stocks now listed in the Annex could
be removed from abstention. The definitions of such terms as "stock,"
"maximum sustainable yield," and "substantial increase" had been de-
bated repeatedly without reaching agreement. The red salmon of Bristol
Bay, the sockeye of the Fraser River, and the stocks farther south all
presented different conditions, yet the United States and Canada main-
tained that they all satisfied the conditions for abstention. Japan had
asked repeatedly when and under what conditions the United States and
Canada would consider removing certain stocks from the Annex. The
only answer had been that it was very difficult to say. As for the herring
of the Queen Charlotte Islands, the Japanese National Section required
an explanation of the difference in conditions between the areas where
they had been removed from abstention and those where they remained
under abstention. As for halibut, explanations had been received regard-
ing Areas 2 and 3A but none had been forthcoming with respect to areas
1 and 3B South. The Japanese National Section's interpretation of Arti-
cle IV(1) (b) made it necessary that further information be emphatically
requested. The Convention required that the abstention cases be dis-
cussed annually and that recommendations be made. Treatment of this
requirement had become negligent in recent years, and this meant that
the members were not fulfilling their obligations under the terms of the
Convention. The Committee should carry on its deliberations conscien-
tiously, but without the necessary information it could not do its work
properly.
Turning from the Commission and committees to the Secretariat,
the Executive Director and Assistant are probably more active in con-
nection with intelligence than with any other decision-making func-
tion. The role of the Executive Director includes some work in the
collection of information, but his primary task is that of acting as a
center for distributing reports and information, coordinating the op-
erations of the national agencies and supervising the actual publication
of information. 177 The first-mentioned duty arises from convention
provisions which call for the parties to furnish such reports as the
'r The following appears in 1956 INPFC AN. REP. at 17:
In general it [the staff] must endeavour to keep a free and efficient flow of data,
samples, techniques and personal contacts between researchers and to assist the
Commission and its working committees on a year-round basis. A description
of the functions of the staff must emphasize the words "promote," "coordinate,"
and "report'
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Commission designates.'7 By Commission decision the Executive
Director engages in the accumulation of these records." 9 In addition
it is the Executive Director who comments upon the form and nature of
the information submitted by the contracting parties pursuant to arti-
cle III (1) (c) (iii)."8
As full-time functionaries it is only natural that the Executive Direc-
tors provide a means for facilitating communication among those who
carry on work between Commission meetings. The scope of this
activity and others performed by the Secretariat is elaborated in this
passage from the 1965 Administrative Report:' 8 '
The Secretariat's workload continues to consist for the most part of man-
uscript preparation, arrangements and staffing for meetings, correspond-
ence in connection with research and publication and facilitation of the
interchange of data, biological samples, and scientific observers.
As in past years, the Secretariat has compiled a yearbook of catch
statistics for the salmon, halibut, herring and bottom-fish fisheries in
areas of common interest to the three member countries, the material for
the yearbook being furnished through the cooperation of the national
research organizations. The Commission's annual report for 1964 was
drafted in part and translated by the Secretariat staff. The bound volume
of "Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting-1964" was prepared,
processed and distributed by the Secretariat early in 1965. The Japanese
version of the 1964 Proceedings was also prepared at the Secretariat and
was processed and bound in Japan with the cooperation of the Japanese
National Section.
In August, the Secretariat served as the meeting place for a two-day
working group conference of groundfish scientists associated with the
three national sections. The principal purpose of the meeting was to
discuss possible ways of expediting and improving the work of the Gulf
of Alaska Groundfish Committee at the 1965 Annual Meeting. During
the year the Secretariat was also favored with visits by Japanese scien-
tists who were in North America to observe halibut and salmon research
activities and by staff scientists of the Canadian and United States fishery
research organizations. The Executive Director and Assistant Director
visited fishery and research installations in the Bristol Bay area in July
as guests of the Fisheries Research Institute of the University of Wash-
ington and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, and they also attended
meetings of the International Pacific Halibut Commission, the Interna-
tional Pacific Salmon Commission, and the Pacific Fishery Biologists.
As was noted above with respect to ICNAF, the Executive Director
'"'INPFC Convention, arts. III(1) (c) (iii), (d), (e) and VIII.
.. See Decisions of the Commission establishing procedure to be followed with
respect to requirements of various articles of the convention, in INPFC HANDBOOK
17 (no date).
" See 1958 INPFC ANtN. REP. 13.
" 1965 INPFC AN. PRoc. 73.
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of the North Pacific Commission also serves an intelligence role re-
garding budgetary matters, namely in providing annexes or "explana-
tory statements" to the Commission in connection with budget esti-
mates. 82 In view of the rigid control otherwise exercised over Com-
mission activities, the Executive Director's initiative in this regard
may well be somewhat muted, but the basis for such initiative none-
theless exists.
B. Recommendations
Recommendation embraces the advocacy of proposals to those with
authority to exercise decision-making functions. Generally speaking,
this is the key formal function performed by all the commissions since
seldom is authority conferred to prescribe directly for the regulation of
fishery operations. However, this does not mean that commissions do
not effectively prescribe. One point to be considered in describing the
commissions' operations is the extent to which recommendations of a
commission are so uniformly adopted that it may not be inaccurate
to regard that commission as possessing authority to prescribe.183
At this juncture we are concerned not with commission authority
vis-A-vis members but with the competence to make recommendations
to the commissions which may be, or may not be, subsequently adopted
as official recommendations to members, or which otherwise attempt
to mold commission policy.
Participation in the recommending process is widespread, with a
variety of groups and individuals contributing as international or in-
tergovernmental officials and as representatives of private groups.
Among the former the roles of scientific staff, secretariat members and,
I INPFC HANDBOOK, Financial Regulation 3.3, at 48 (no date).
'It is perhaps this distinction which accounts for the seeming mistake in the
following assertion regarding the prescriptive competence of the Halibut Com-
mission: "The regulatory powers [of the Commission] have the force of law of each
country, subject only to the possible disapproval of the respective governments."
CHPISTY & ScoT, supra note 107, at 196-97. A footnote to this sentence states that
"FAO, Comparisont and Abstracts.. .p. 18, seems to be misinformed on this matter..."
The FAO study declared at 18 that "The measures of some Commissions are con-
fined to recommendations (whatever the phraseology) made to Contracting Parties,"
citing the Halibut Commission, among others. This statement is certainly correct,
and Christy and Scott wrong, if the reference is only to the text of the convention.
The latter requires the affirmative approval of the parties as a condition of the
effectiveness of Commission recommendations; it does not provide that recommen-
dations become effective in the absence of disapproval, as Christy and Scott appear
to imply. However, the most important point is that the pattern of practice in
uniformly approving Commission recommendation may have, and perhaps has,
reached the stage where the Commission can be regarded as itself possessing the
competence to prescribe. In other words, description of the actual authority of a
governmental body must look beyond the terms employed in conferring formal
authority upon it to include the expectations created by the behavior of the parties.
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in two instances, panels and regional committees are of special interest.
Like the important role they play with respect to the intelligence func-
tion, independent scientific staffs also occupy a pivotal position in the
recommending process and the reasons for this seem reasonably obvi-
ous. In general the persons appointed to the various commissions
which have staffs are not scientifically trained in this specialized area,
hence it may reasonably be expected that the proposals advanced by
staff members equipped with such training would be given particular
weight. This is an instance in which skill, in the sense of special train-
ing and capacity, serves as a base of power.8 4 An examination of the
proceedings of the Tuna Commission is especially enlightening in this
respect for it is apparent that proposals of the Executive Director,
based upon the findings of the staff, are very influential in determin-
ing Commission action or, sometimes of equal importance, refusal to
take action. Although the annual reports of the Halibut and Salmon
Commissions do not provide sound bases for generalizing about the
degree of influence of the staff, it seems likely that in these instances
too its expertise is an important factor in the eventual Commission
decision.
For those commissions with a central headquarters consisting of
a secretariat but not a staff, the executive secretary, as chief admin-
istrative officer, is sometimes explicitly authorized to make recom-
mendations to the commission on certain matters. For instance, while
the primary competence to recommend on the part of the Executive
Secretary of ICNAF concerns budgetary matters, at least so far as the
Rules of Procedure and the Financial Regulations expressly indicate,
it is apparent from the Commission reports that the Secretariat, which
is directed by the Executive Secretary, at least reports, and probably
makes recommendations, with respect to a considerable range of other
matters. This is, of course, wholly in accord with the convention,
which provides that the Executive Secretary shall perform such func-
tions as the Commission requires. The Executive Secretary's role in
INPFC also includes making recommendations concerning various
substantive matters in connection, for example, with coordination of
research efforts.
In both ICNAF and INPFC the part played by the Executive
Secretary (or Director) in budgetary affairs merits special note. In
both groups the authority of this office, expressed in identical financial
"MSee generally, H. LASSWELL & M. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 83-92 (1950).
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regulations, includes preparation of original budget estimates to which
the Executive Secretary may append such annexes or statements, be-
yond those requested by the Commission, as he deems necessary and
useful. To the extent the direction of future Commission work is de-
pendent upon budgetary considerations, this competence embraces
substantive concerns as well as those strictly budgetary in nature.
In addition to the delegation to committees of responsibility for
devising recommendations, which is normal procedure in the fishery
commissions as in any organization, two of the commissions have sub-
groups, representing different regions within the convention area,
which initiate the proposals that the commission may ultimately rec-
ommend to members. Within ICNAF, in particular, the panels are the
most important components of the Commission for this purpose. Arti-
cle VIII, the key provision in the convention, declares in paragraph 1
that "The Commission may, on the recommendation of one or more
Panels, and on the basis of scientific investigations, transmit to the
depository government proposals, for joint action by the contracting
governments...." (emphasis added). Moreover, while this provision
appears to envisage panel recommendations affecting a particular sub-
area, the panels' competence extends also to making recommendations
for the entire convention area. Thus, paragraph 5 provides that the
Commission is to consult with all the panels before transmitting pro-
posals affecting the convention areas as a whole. Consultation here
appears to permit each panel some measure of competence to make
recommendations regarding even areas outside its primary concern.
Complementing these primary subjects of recommendation, the panels
are authorized to recommend to the Commission "studies within the
scope of this Convention which are deemed necessary in the develop-
ment of factual information relating to its particular subarea."'18 5
The panels also have a certain competence with respect to their own
composition and subarea of concern. Article IV(2) deals with panel
representation and declares that the Commission, "after consultation
with the Panel concerned," is empowered to determine such representa-
tion. As noted earlier, such "consultation," when required as a pre-
liminary to decision, suggests the capacity to offer recommendations
for the ultimate decision. The panels affected may also, if unani-
mously agreed, recommend that the Commission alter the boundaries
of the subareas described in the annex to the convention. Apparently,
' ICNAF Convention, art. VII(3).
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however, the Commission is not limited to this procedure for changing
the subdivisions of the convention area.
Access by private groups to the recommendation phase in the de-
cision-making process also deserves emphasis in this context, for ad-
visory groups explicitly drawn from private interests are a part of the
commission structure in five of the situations here examined.' In
addition to other activities involving liaison with interested parties
within the member states, the advisory committees are occupied with
the advocacy of proposals. Such advocacy may take the form both of
initiation of proposals for consideration within the commission or a
subsidiary body and of response, or counter-proposals, to recommen-
dations made by the commission. 18 7 In either event this provision for
access to the commission presents, at least potentially, some delicate
questions of policy for it brings into the formal operation of the de-
cision-making process those potentially subject to regulations. At the
present stage in the development of fishery regulatory mechanisms,
however, it is unlikely that the public interest is deprived in any sub-
stantial way since the commissions themselves are largely limited to
making recommendations to member governments. Moreover, the suc-
cess of the commissions in proposing actions which are in fact imple-
mented depends in some measure upon the concurrence of regulated
groups which, within their own states, may be able to wield consider-
able effective political power. This support of effective power groups
is, perhaps, sufficiently useful to warrant the present arrangements.
Thought should be given, however, to the inclusion of wider interest
groupings as the institutional structure acquires greater direct com-
petence over fishery exploitation. 8
Wider participation is already possible under the Tuna, Northwest
Atlantic, and North Pacific Conventions since in each instance the
Commission is authorized to hold public hearings.'89 Only the North-
west Atlantic Commission is limited with respect to the subject-matter
of these hearings, article VI(d) referring to hearings "in connection
with the development of complete factual information necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Convention.... ." The Commissioners
' See text at notes 51-75 supra.
' This is most interesting in connection with the Halibut and Salmon Com-
missions which meet and discuss proposals with advisory groups and thereafter
promulgate them, presumably after decisions based on these consultations.
" Here, as in other regulatory processes, other features of the public interest
may require protection, as for example, representation of consumer groups.
" IATTC Convention, art. 1(12) ; INPFC Convention, art. 11(9).
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of member countries are also specifically authorized to hold public
hearings "within the territories they represent." In addition, of course,
the regular constitutional or statutory procedure for implementing
commission recommendations may, depending on the internal arrange-
ments within each member, permit groups outside the immediately af-
fected industry to have a voice in the ultimate implementation of
fishery regulations.
C. Prescription
The function of prescribing is discharged by the promulgation of
general policies for regulating interactions that fall within the scope
of the authority of the organization. Insofar as external interactions
are concerned, i.e., the actual conduct of fishery operations by member
states, it is immediately apparent that with only one exception the
fishery commissions have not been granted any consequential com-
petence to prescribe. 10 The sole exception is the Salmon Commission,
some of whose regulations do not require the subsequent approval of
the two member states. Even this exception is weak; although initially
all Commission regulations were effective without such approval, in
1957 the provision was changed to stipulate that only "orders for the
adjustment of closing or opening of fishing periods and areas in any
fishing season and of emergency orders required to carry out the pro-
visions of the Convention" were not subject to approval.' 9 '
Prescribing for the internal operations of commissions is commonly
carried out in varying measure by all component organs and individual
officials from the body of the commissioners to the executive secretary
or director of the staff. Generally speaking, the various commissions
are afforded the predominant role in prescribing, as in such mundane
matters as rules of procedure, attendance at meetings by outsiders,
financial regulations, and policies regarding recruitment and operation
of the staff. However, where there is a director of investigations and
a full-time professional staff, as in the Salmon, Halibut, and Tuna
Commissions, effective authority to prescribe in certain instances re-
sides in the head of the staff operation, especially in such matters as
recruitment policies as well as the day-to-day operations of the staff.
Moreover, the executive secretaries in the commissions without staffs
also are authorized, on occasion, to lay down general prescriptions,
most probably on matters arising in the interval between meetings of
"° But see note 182 mupra.
"' Salmon Convention, Protocol art. III.
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the commission. For example, in both the North Pacific and Northwest
Atlantic Commissions, the executive director or secretary "in case of
doubt as to the interpretation or application of any of the foregoing
(financial) regulations... is authorized to rule thereon after consul-
tation with the Chairman."' 9 2 The Chairmen of these two Commis-
sions also have a measure of competence to prescribe as provided in
substantially identical procedural rules. They "may make such de-
cisions and give such directions" to the Executive Secretary (or Di-
rector), "especially in the intervals between meetings of the Commis-
sion," as will ensure that the Commission business "is carried out
efficiently and in accordance with its decisions."' 9 3
Within the Northwest Atlantic Commission the panels have a certain
autonomy in prescribing their own rules of procedure for meetings and
for the exercise of their other functions. The provision to this effect
in article IV(3) has been interpreted to mean that only the panel, and
not the Commission, has authority to prescribe these rules. It is not
known whether this distinction is a mere formality, but it may be
meaningful that panel rules were adopted after their "suggestion" by
the Commission. Panel chairmen also appear to have a measure of
competence to prescribe as a consequence of the panel rule, identical
to the Commission rule mentioned above, that the Chairman is en-
titled "generally, to make such decision and give such directions to the
Executive Secretary as will ensure... that the business of the Panel
is carried out efficiently and in accordance with its decisions.'
1 94
V. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the general world constitutive process of
decision-making are most significant for their potential contribution
to the task of appraising the decision-making processes involved in
regulating international fishery exploitation. In a fundamental deci-
sion, the 13th Session of the FAO Conference in 1965 amended the
FAO Constitution to establish a Committee on Fisheries as a part of a
general reorganization designed to give greater recognition within FAO
to the unique importance and urgency of international fishery prob-
lems. The Committee is to:' 95
'.. INPFC HANDBOOK, Financial Regulation 14.2, at 60 (no date); 1965 ICNAF
HANDBOOK 60.
'INPFC HANDBOOK, Rule of Procedure 14(g), at 33 (no date); 1965 ICNAF
HANDBOOK, Rule of Procedure 8(h), at 41.
1" 1965 ICNAF HANDBOOK, Rule of Procedure 7(g), at 49.
" FAO GENERAL RULE XXX, PROVISIONAL REPORT OF THE THIRTEENTH SESSION
OF THE CONFERENCE 81 (1965).
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(b) Conduct periodic general reviews of fishery problems of an inter-
national character and appraise such problems and their possible solu-
tions with a view to concerted action by nations, by FAO and by other
governmental bodies....
(d) Consider the desirability of preparing and submitting to Member
Nations an international convention under Article XIV of the Constitu-
tion to ensure effective international cooperation and consultation in fish-
eries on a world scale....
The Committee first met in June, 1966, and quickly demonstrated
its awareness of the need for a close look at the decision-making proc-
esses represented by the intergovernmental fishery commissions. In
reference to the duties stated in Rule XXX (6) (d), quoted above, the
Committee report declares:196
The Committee was agreed that in order to adequately perform its
function in the field of international cooperation, it needed to define
those subjects and areas where such cooperation was needed but not yet
effectively provided by existing bodies. The Committee came to the
conclusion that the best way of approaching this task was through the
establishment of a Subcommittee to review the terms of reference, com-
position, and activities of existing bodies and to draw from that review
suitable conclusions with regard both to the need for further action by
the Committee and FAO and also regarding steps that the bodies con-
cerned, or their members, could take in order to ensure their greatest
possible success.
The significance of this development should not be underestimated.
For the first time on an international level, continuous, informed, and
(of most importance) authoritative scrutiny is to be brought to bear
on existing institutions directed at fishery management. The funda-
mental purpose is plainly conceived: to assess their effectiveness and
to make recommendations "to ensure their greatest possible suc-
cess."'19 7 The committee acknowledged "that an assessment of the
effectiveness of existing fishery bodies would be a delicate and difficult
task" and that the subcommittee could "determine to what extent it
should be attempted."' 98 Whatever this determination may be, the
FAO Committee on Fisheries could have significant impact on the
future structure and management of international fishery organiza-
tions.
' FAO Com nTTEm oN FIsHERIEs, FAO FISHERIEs REP., No. 33, FAO Doc.
Flp/R33 (En), para. 13, at 2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as FAO FIs. REP.].
'. FAO FIsH. REP., para. 13, at 2.
FAO FisH. REP., para. 16, at 3.
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Finally, summary reference is here made either to possible improve-
ments in the phases of the decision-making process dealt with herein
or to problems involved in attempts to improve the process.
A. Capacity
It is not entirely clear whether serious difficulties have been ex-
perienced by reason of the failure to make adequate provision for legal
capacity in the fisheries treaties, but it is certain that some difficulties
have had to be surmounted. Possibly this can be dismissed as an
inconsequential drain upon organizational efficiency. There seems to
be no necessity to conclude, however, that the future will so resemble
the past that no remedial measures are required. Smoothness and
efficiency in operation may come to be of far greater importance in
new, or reconstituted, fishery commissions, thus magnifying the con-
tribution of an appropriate provision on legal capacity. As noted,
there are no intellectual difficulties involved, nor do we lack the tools
for such detailed specification as may be desired.
B. Membership
Assuming, as most observers do, increased participation over the
next decade by states in ocean fishery exploitation with resulting
greater pressure on resources, provisions for membership in existing
conservation groups would appear to need careful examination for
possible revision. No doubt all concerned are in agreement that any
state with a genuine interest in a particular area, or a stock or stocks
of fish, should be included in any organization formed, or recreated, to
establish a conservation regime. Apparently the trend is to include as
"interested" states those bordering on a region or fishery, whether or
not they engage in fishing at all.'99 It does not seem entirely clear,
however, that such all-inclusive membership is sound or, indeed, any
more advisable than overly restrictive membership provisions. It may
be noted, in particular, that voting arrangements calling either for
unanimity or some form of majority decision invite problems when
some members do not, in fact, have anything at stake in the merits of
a decision. Such states are enabled, thereby, more easily to introduce
extraneous factors as relevant for their decision.
.. See notes 16 and 23 supra. See also FAO FISH. REP., para. 22, at 3. The new
Atlantic Tuna Commission has no restriction on adherence, beyond membership in
the United Nations, a specialized agency.
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The whole problem of rationalizing membership is likely to be com-
plicated in the future as the objectives in managing fisheries are
broadened to include shared goals in the production and distribution
of wealth. If it has been difficult in the past to secure multilateral
agreement upon conservation, defined in terms of physical yield, future
arrangements aiming at wider goals are likely to confront vastly
greater obstacles. Satisfactory provision for membership will then re-
quire resolution of the conflicting aims of states with divergent eco-
nomic, social, and political systems. This consideration underlines
also the observation above regarding the inclusion of nonfishing adja-
cent states which may have no discernible present interest in the
problems involved.
C. Objectives
Obviously this aspect of the fishery agreements requires far greater
work and thought for successful revision than any other. Indeed,
some observers are sufficiently pessimistic that they would not attempt
revision to take account of economic aspects of regulation, at least not
without a substantial increment in the level of work done by econo-
mists. 00 There is a good deal of attraction in this position, for the
simple reason that it is useless to revise old agreements or concur on
new ones unless there is some reasonable hope that provisions for
allocating yield have validity and acceptability. Acceptability is per-
haps more important than validity, yet it may be more difficult to
achieve unless we can begin to come up with some disinterested eco-
nomic analysis and recommendations. Such a task is not now being
undertaken and while prospects for study are improving, the prognosis
is still not too encouraging. Accordingly the most important recom-
mendation in this respect is to join in urging intensification of economic
analysis of the development of ocean resources.
Mr. Milton James makes the apt observation:
[I] t would be wise to ascertain whether economics of the fisheries are sufficiently
well understood to permit their use in practical management. Have economists
studied the peculiar circumstances of private exploitation of a public resource
deeply enough to enable them to take an active part in its management? If not, it
may be fortunate that fishery administrators refrain from attempting to hybrid-
ize the sciences of biology and economics on a "Do it Yourself" basis.
CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 107, at 25.
Dr. W. M. Chapman has a good many reservations, including concern over the
lack of imputs from economists. Indeed, he calls the absence of economists at work on
fishery problems the "most ridiculous part" of the recommendation for United Na-
tions jurisdiction over high seas fisheries. Chapman, On the Management of Ocean
Fisheries, GOVERNOR'S ADvIsoRy COMMISSION ON OCEAN RESOURCES, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIFTH MEETING 105 (1966).
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D. Structure of Organization and Distribution of Authority
In view of the minimal authority granted to fishery commissions it
may be unrealistic to cavil about the simplistic organizational struc-
ture created for them. In most instances there is no central executive
organ and the only continuing body is the staff. Only three commis-
sions have been given a permanent, professional research arm, and it
is especially noteworthy that of these only one, the Tuna Commission,
was created since World War II. There is then an interesting jux-
taposition. On the one hand, there is a widespread favorable appraisal
of the fishing industry's record in constantly increasing production
since World War II, yet in that same period the most important de-
velopment in the structure of the fishery conservation groups-the
creation of a genuinely independent, international staff-has been
permitted to occur but once. When opportunity for such creation
was most recently presented at the Atlantic Tuna Conference in May,
1966, it was firmly rejected by those responsible for choice.
The Atlantic Tuna Conference is perhaps instructive in view of the
observation that "representatives of seventeen nations widely differing
in interest, economic and political ideas, and in degree of development,
all collaborated harmoniously to a common purpose.'"12  It is true that
the delegates managed to produce a convention establishing an Atlantic
Tuna Commission and in this sense harmony triumphed. However,
the states involved conferred very little authority upon the Commission
and did not even endow it with an independent staff. It is easy to
produce harmony when the cost is low. The value of this experience is
not likely to be great since future problems probably can be resolved
only by establishing groups equipped with an appropriate staff and
with sufficient authority to deal with the problems they face.*
Address by FAO Director-General in FAO FIsH. REP., app. D, at 3.
* This article was submitted in January, 1967. Statements and conclusions of the
author are based on information then available and not subsequent thereto.
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